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CONCERN OF CPSU FOR USSR NATIONAL SECURITY STRESSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 5-12

[Editorial: "The Concern of the Communist Party for the Security of the Socialist Fatherland"]

[Text] The defense of the victories of Great October for the Communist Party and the Soviet government has always been a cause of prime importance. The 26th Congress reaffirmed this. In the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the congress, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, particularly emphasized that "the party and state at no time has lost sight of the questions of *strengthening the defense might of the nation and its Armed Forces*."¹ This is a historical necessity caused by the aggressive nature of imperialism.

The idea of the inevitable armed defense of socialism was established even in the works of K. Marx and F. Engels. They pointed out that a proletarian revolution is an extremely complex phenomenon and can encompass a protracted period of fierce class struggle, civil wars and international clashes.² In analyzing the political situation in Europe in the middle of the 19th century, F. Engels wrote: "I proceed from the view that any victorious revolution in Paris in 1852 would certainly cause an immediate war by the Holy Alliance against France."³ The founders of scientific communism drew an important theoretical conclusion that the working class needed its own military organization and its own mass army in order to successfully defend the socialist victories.

The founder of our party, V. I. Lenin, made an outstanding contribution to the further elaboration of the theory and to the solving of practical problems in creating the armed forces of a socialist state under the new historical conditions and namely during the period that capitalism entered its higher stage of development, imperialism. He scientifically established the question of the need for the revolution's army and outlined its historic role, tasks and paths of formation. On the basis of a profound scientific analysis of specific historical conditions and the balance of

class forces on the international scene, Lenin pointed out that after the revolutionary people had seized power, the overthrown ruling classes would endeavor to regain it. The imperialists of other nations would also attack us. For this reason "a series of the most terrible clashes between the Soviet republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."⁴

In elaborating a military program for the proletariat, V. I. Lenin created the teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland. He established the need for this defense, he defined its forms and drew conclusions on the scientific and technical preparations for defense, on the creation of a military organization for the Soviet republic and on the leading and directing role of the Communist Party in carrying out the tasks of strengthening the defense might of the Soviet state and the building up of its Armed Forces.

Lenin constantly demanded that the greatest vigilance be shown for the counterrevolutionary forces. "...He who forgets the danger constantly hanging over us," he wrote, "and which will not cease as long as world imperialism exists, the person who forgets this forgets our labor republic."⁵

In being guided by these Leninist instructions and admonishments, the Communist Party and its Central Committee during all stages of the socialist society's construction have done everything possible in the military area so that the creative labor of the Soviet labor be securely protected. No matter how the malicious imperialists of all hues endeavored to break or stifle the world's first state of the working people, they did not succeed in doing this. Due to the wise leadership of the Communist Party and to the constant concern for strengthening the defense capability of the nation and the Armed Forces, all the campaigns of the interventionists and invasions of aggressors were successfully driven off.

Thus it was. And, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "We will do everything so that this is the case in the future as well!"⁶

However, modern imperialism, in living through the most acute stage of the general crisis, in the search for a way out of it has noticeably increased its aggressiveness. It is beguiling itself with the hope of turning back the wheel of history. The most militant circles headed by the rabid U.S. militarists "have set the goal of achieving the unachievable, that is, to erect a barrier on the path of progressive changes in the world and to recover the role of the disposers of the fate of the world."⁷ In terms of other nations, they think only in categories of domination and force. For the sake of achieving their goals, the imperialists are ready for anything, for adventurism and for wagering with the vital interests of mankind. But on this path of theirs the forces of socialism headed by the USSR, the world communist and workers movement and all peace-loving peoples stand as a mighty barrier. The pretenders for world rule and primarily the United States direct their arrows against these forces and primarily against the nations of the socialist commonwealth. They do not disdain any means, including the dirtiest. At the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that the imperialists and their henchmen are acting against the socialist nations with ever-greater refinement and perfidiousness, they systematically conduct hostile campaigns against them and blacken and distort everything occurring in these states.⁸ For example, in the United States it has gone so far that slander, provocations, sabotage and terror have been elevated to the rank of a state policy.

The present U.S. administration is wagering particularly on force in the struggle against the USSR and the other socialist nations. It has openly stated its intention to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, it is hatching one plan after another for making nuclear attacks against our cities and other installations and has cranked up the arms race to full strength. At present, militarization permeates a predominant majority of the economic spheres both in the United States and in the other leading capitalist powers which is its partners in the nefarious deals. Virtually all sectors of their economy directly or indirectly are engaged in producing defense products which run into the millions. Their defense expenditures have reached unprecedented amounts and are continuing to grow. Thus, while direct expenditures for defense needs in the NATO nations reached 104 billion dollars in 1970, in 1980 they reached almost 240 billion and over the last 10 years have exceeded 1.6 trillion dollars.⁹

Here the tone is set by the United States. Thus, in 1980 and 1981, it outstripped its NATO allies by an average of 1.5-2.5 percent. For the next fiscal year, the growth of the defense budget is to be on a level of 6-7 percent and will reach 226.3 billion dollars. In subsequent years the Reagan Administration has proposed spending the following amounts on defense purposes: 259.6 billion dollars in 1983, 294.9 billion in 1984, 333.0 billion in 1985 and 374.3 billion in 1986.¹⁰ As a total over the 5 years, Washington intends to allocate 1.5 trillion dollars for militaristic measures.¹¹ To this it must be added that the U.S. defense allocations are not restricted to just the official amounts and a portion of them is concealed in the maze of so-called civilian sections of the federal budget.

In rapidly producing the most modern means for conducting war, the United States has endeavored to maximally widen its military presence everywhere possible. At present *the United States outside its territory possesses 1,500 military bases and installations with a half million servicemen.*^{11a} The half million American troops are stationed in more than 15 nations. The United States has shown particular tenacity in creating military bases close to the Soviet frontiers and in areas adjacent to the USSR. The United States is also drawing other states into the orbit of its global strategy. Thus, the NATO nations and Japan are already keeping more than 5 million servicemen under arms and are ready to call up another 7 million reservists and civilian personnel for military service.¹²

The Chinese leadership is siding evermore closely with the imperialists. Not long ago a new step was taken in further establishing military cooperation between China and the United States. The Reagan Administration acceded to the Maoists in satisfying their desire to obtain weapons and military equipment. England and firms in the FRG, France, Italy, Japan and a number of other nations have also expressed readiness to "aid" Beijing in the arms race. This decision of theirs "opens up a new dangerous stage in the partnership of the Beijing leaders with imperialism."^{12a}

The imperialists have concealed their militaristic actions behind the haze of the imaginary "Soviet military threat." On this question an editorial in PRAVDA states: "Over the 9 months it has been in power the new administration (Reagan's.--Editors) has built a whole pile of anti-Soviet cock-and-bull stories. Some fabrications are amassed and others are created. There has been an unique escalation of slander."^{12b}

The Pentagon has undertaken the next big lie operation in publishing a pamphlet entitled "Soviet Military Might." Its whole purpose "is to unleash a propaganda war against the socialist nations, to continue to increase tension on the international scene, to check the process of limiting weapons in every possible way and further the arms race."^{12c}

According to information in the newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, at present the Pentagon strategists, in ignoring the lessons of history, are hatching far-reaching aggressive plans in preparing to wage simultaneously large and small wars in the most different regions of the world. "...Particularly perfidious," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in replying to questions posed by the editors of the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL, "are the arguments of certain strategists and politicians in the West on the admissibility of a 'limited' nuclear war and the possibility of being victorious in it."^{12d} In flying into a war-like rage, they have brazenly begun talking about the possibility of making nuclear strikes against military installations on Soviet territory in the aim of disarming the USSR. Here is one such statement: "The United States would not stop short of the use of military force, including nuclear weapons."¹³

At present, the United States is in fact openly conducting increased preparations for a war against the USSR and the nations of the socialist commonwealth. The United States has gained the permission of the NATO leadership to deploy a large group of new, more advanced missiles (cruise and Pershing-2) on the territory of a number of its European partners in the aggressive bloc, it has begun series production of the most barbarian neutron bomb, it is conducting impressively large-scaled military maneuvers in direct proximity to the frontiers of the USSR and the fraternal nations and is carrying out various sorts of provocations.

Naturally, in such a tense international situation, the Communist Party, the Soviet government, all our people and their Armed Forces are closely watching the intrigues of the aggressors and are taking the necessary measures to properly rebuff the presumptuous admirers of military adventures.

In responding to a question posed by a PRAVDA correspondent, L. I. Brezhnev firmly cautioned those who cannot wait to use nuclear weapons: "...Only a person who has decided to commit suicide would start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging as the victor from it. No matter what might the attacking side possessed, no matter what method for initiating a nuclear war he chose, he would never achieve his goals. Retaliation would follow inevitably."¹⁴

The word of our party is a firm word. Behind it lie the constantly growing economic might of the socialist state, the fabulous strength and unbreakable unity of the Soviet people and their battle tested and tempered Armed Forces. The aggressors should not forget this. The Soviet nation has repeatedly and convincingly demonstrated to world imperialism that it is dangerous to come against us with the sword as all invasions of Soviet land have ended with a defeat.

But imperialism would not be imperialism if it did not strive for domination and did not carry out a policy of plunder, violence and piracy. It is the constant source of tension and wars. The world had not yet succeeded in damping the conflagration of World War II when the most aggressive U.S. forces began to hatch new military

adventures. In relying on its military economic base which had increased by many fold during the war years and in using scientists and specialists brought in from Europe, the United States moved from the experimental models of atomic bombs which it possessed in 1945 to their series manufacturing. On the world scene it began to conduct a policy of threat, blackmail and the putting together of military blocs aimed at the USSR and the other socialist countries. In counting on a monopoly of nuclear weapons and on the might of their strategic air forces, navy and unmanned weapons, the aggressive U.S. circles hatched plans to destroy the USSR and all the nations of the socialist commonwealth.

In this complicated and tense situation, the Communist Party and the Soviet government were forced to take immediate and decisive measures in response. Scientists and specialists were confronted with the task of developing our own nuclear weapons and the delivery systems needed for this and training the troops and naval forces to operate under conditions where the aggressor employed weapons of mass destruction. The solving of this problem was at the center of attention of the party Central Committee and the government. They mobilized the finest forces for this work. The intense efforts were crowned with success. In 1949, the USSR began to have its own modern weapons at its disposal.

In carrying out Lenin's teachings on the defense of the socialist fatherland, the Communist Party has defined the basic areas in the development of military science and military art, the technical equipping of the army and navy and new weapons. The 24th CPSU Congress particularly pointed to the need to increase the defense capability of the motherland in every possible way. In the Accountability Report, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that "as long as we live in a troubled world, this task remains one of the main ones!"¹⁵

In subsequent years the questions related to national defense were constantly focused on at the party congresses and Central Committee plenums and were reflected in the speeches and works of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The decisions adopted by the party inevitably emphasized the need for further strengthening the defense capability of the USSR and outlined ways to improve the Armed Forces.

Over the years of the post-war five-year plans, the nation's economic potential has risen continuously and its scientific and technical capabilities have been significantly broadened. In the new stage of our state's development, the party has worked out a military policy in terms of the conditions of developed socialism and the existing international situation. Its essence is that "in relying on economic and scientific-potential and considering the advantages of socialism, to ensure the primary development of those areas of scientific and technical progress which are capable of most fully and thoroughly satisfying the defense needs of the nation and the Armed Forces for effective weapons."¹⁶ At the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee devoted to a discussion of the plans aimed at carrying out the large-scale tasks outlined by the party to increase the nation's economic potential, L. I. Brezhnev reaffirmed that our defense needs are securely provided for.

The fundamentally new qualitative changes which have occurred in the technical equipping of the army and navy have caused profound changes also in the organizational structure of our Armed Forces. At present they consist of the Strategic

Rocket Troops, the Ground Troops, the Air Defense Troops, the Air Forces, the Navy and Border Troops. In terms of organizational structure and technical support they now fully meet today's needs. Their combat capability and readiness are on a high level.

The general political line of strengthening the defenses of the Soviet state and building up the Armed Forces is set by the Communist Party, its Central Committee and Politburo headed by the loyal continuer of the cause of Lenin, the outstanding political and state figure of modern times, the wise and tested leader and the indefatigable and consistent fighter for peace and communism, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the 75th birthday of whom the entire progressive world will celebrate this month. The increased role of the CPSU in strengthening the nation's defense capability is caused by the complexity and dynamicness of international relations, by the broader international tasks of the Armed Forces, by the strengthened military-political alliance of the socialist states and by the growing significance of the moral and political factor in the course and outcome of modern wars. As the scale of military affairs grows and becomes more complex, the role of the CPSU in solving defense problems constantly increases. This is due to the fact that the improving of the Soviet Armed Forces is closely tied to our society's development and to its greater dynamism which requires a continuous rise in the level of party leadership. Our Army and Navy with their present organizational structure, technical equipping and weapons, with their very labor intensive and differentiated training of the personnel, have become a many-sided social institution. They require constant attention from the party.

The Communist Party plays the crucial role in elaborating the fundamental provisions in the area of military science, military doctrine and strategy, it also works out the scientifically based programs and principles of military organizational development and defines the tasks of the army and navy, the paths of their development, the content, forms and methods for training and indoctrinating the men.

The Defense Council plays a major role in the organizational development of the Army and Navy. It is headed by L. I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Marshal of the Soviet Union. With his enormous capacity for work, exceptional organization, efficiency, political wisdom and capacity to find the key to the hearts of people, in this body he has created a healthy, business-like atmosphere and makes a major personal contribution to strengthening the nation's defense capability.

In giving a crucial role to the Strategic Rocket Troops which have become the basis of the Soviet Armed Forces' combat might and the basic means for decisively defeating an aggressor, our party and government clearly realize that for full victory in a modern war, efforts are required by all the Armed Services and branches of troops. For this reason they are concerned for their harmonious development in accord with their combat mission.

The equipping of the Army and Navy with modern weapons inevitably causes profound qualitative shifts in the nature and content of military service and places ever-higher demands on the personnel and their professional training.

that in the past and government measures aimed at raising the educational level of the military personnel, over one-half of the Army and Navy command personnel has a higher and specialized military education. The proportional amount of engineers and technicians has increased sharply in the troops. For example, while in the middle of the 1930's, engineer and technical personnel comprised an average of 28 percent of the officer corps, at present engineers and technicians hold around one-half of the officer positions in the Army and Navy.¹⁷

The USSR adheres to the Marxist principle of recruiting and placing personnel, of the rational combining of experienced and young military workers and their combined operating. At present, more than 65 percent of the officers on the regimental level is under the age of 40. Many born after the Great Patriotic War are presently in command of companies, batteries, squadrons, battalions and ships.¹⁸

and a party-professional policy has brought good results and has helped to improve the knowledge of the military collectives and the indoctrination of the personnel, to increase their combat skills and ultimately to raise the combat readiness of the military units and ships.

The Communist Party and its Central Committee have always given and do give primary significance to the ideological and political indoctrination of the Soviet people and the personnel of the Armed Forces. This is convincingly shown in the congress resolutions, the other guiding party documents and in particular such decrees of the CPSU Central Committee as "On Measures to Improve Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" and "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination." This is explicable as the successful carrying out of the tasks related to the defense of the Motherland is directly dependent upon the level of the soldiers' political consciousness and their political awareness. The higher this is, the fiercer and more tenacious the fatherland's defenders, the more profoundly and sincerely they understand and actively carry out their duty to it. In the Recommendations Report at the 19th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev set the specific task: "To contribute to forming a generation of people who are politically active, conscientious, have ideas and know how to work and are always ready to defend their Motherland."¹⁹

Communist indoctrination is a powerful force. It unites the men of the Army and Navy into a military collective and inspires them to unflinching military service and sacrifice for the sake of the Motherland. An ideologically and politically prepared soldier is not only totally loyal to the Motherland, the party and the people but he also understands with its essence and aims ideology. As is known the Soviet Armed Forces are constantly in the sphere of close attention for the imperialist subversive centers. The ideological supervisors and hired slanderers distort their words, motives and historical purpose and "endeavor to blacken in the eyes of the peoples of foreign nations the public appearance of the Soviet liberator soldier and to annihilate the immortal feat of the USSR Armed Forces in the defeat of fascism. Imperialist propaganda is aimed at blunting the political vigilance of the Soviet military, reducing their devotion to the Communist Party, to the people and to the great ideals of communism, undermining the social values of our society and ultimately undermining the political and moral state of the personnel and their readiness to defend the Motherland."²⁰

Under the conditions of the exacerbated international situation, when the militant forces of imperialism are intensely brandishing their weapons, it is essential to be particularly vigilant. "Our duty," states the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "on Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination," "is to oppose the subversive political and ideological activities of the class enemy and its well-orchestrated intrigues with unflinching solidarity, a strong ideological will of our ranks, profound conviction and political vigilance on the part of each Soviet man and his readiness to defend the motherland and the revolutionary interests of socialism."¹¹

This party instruction is a combat mission for the commanders and political workers in our divisions and for the party and Komsomol organizations. Using all forms and means of party political work, they must make each serviceman aware of the increased responsibility of our heroic Armed Forces to defend the motherland and to explain the necessity of constantly improving military skills, strengthening vigilance and raising combat readiness. It is very important that the Army and Navy personnel be perfectly aware of the gravity of the danger which is posed by the aggressive political course of the most reactionary U.S. forces and their supporters.

In constantly studying Lenin's ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland, the Communist Party has nurtured our Armed Forces who securely guard the peaceful labor of the builders of communism. Predatory wars are alien to the Soviet state. Soviet military doctrine has a strictly defensive nature. From the very first day of the establishing of worker and peasant power, the party has conducted an intense struggle for peace. At the present stage a titanic struggle in this area is being conducted by the CPSU Central Committee headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev who has achieved outstanding personal success in elaborating and implementing party and state foreign policy. Our Armed Forces are a mighty factor for maintaining peace and preventing a new world war. They, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, will possess a powerful counterweight if new types of weapons appear in the arsenals of the United States and the other NATO members. A strong blend of high technical equipment, military skill and unshakable morale was demonstrated, in particular, by the 1980 Armed Forces Exercises "Zapad-81" (West-81).¹² Along with the armies of the socialist nations, they defend the interests of not only our fraternal peoples but also the workers of the other countries. The time is over when aggressive forces could deal with other peoples with impunity. The path of carrying out the aggressive policy of imperialist reaction is now blocked by the might of the armed forces of the fraternal states united in the Warsaw Pact. The Appeal "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the world" adopted at the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet stated that the peoples paid too dearly for not being able to prevent World War II. This was a terrible lesson. The tragedy must not be allowed to repeat itself. "Along the path of struggle against the world of imperialism," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "a mighty weapon for defending the socialist states has been forged by collective efforts. At the same time this is a weapon of freedom for those who are engaged in an armed struggle against imperialism. Our might is a bulwark of peace and all who are fighting against the threat of a new world war. In defending socialism and peace we are defending the future of mankind."

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 66.
- 2 K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 8, p 431.
- 3 Ibid., Vol 7, p 495.
- 4 V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 139.
- 5 Ibid., Vol 42, p 173.
- 6 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 6.
- 7 Ibid., p 21.
- 8 Ibid., p 9.
- 9 PRAVDA, 27 August 1981.
- 10 ZAR BEZNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 8, 1981, p 17.
- 11 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 August 1981.
- 12 PRAVDA, 18 October 1981.
- 13 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 August 1981.
- 14 PRAVDA, 28 October 1981.
- 15 Ibid., 18 October 1981.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid., 3 November 1981.
- 18 Ibid., 25 July 1981.
- 19 Ibid., 21 October 1981.
- 20 "Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p 81.
- 21 "Partiya i Armiya" [Party and Army], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p 294.
- 22 "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [The Soviet Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1978, p 474.
- 23 Ibid.

- 19 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 67.
- 20 KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 17, 1981, p 5.
- 21 "O dal'neyshem uluchshenii ideologicheskoy, politiko-vospitatel'noy raboty"
[On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination], Moscow, Polit-
izdat, 1979, p 9.
- 22 KOMMUNIST, No 14, 1981, p 12.
- 23 L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 2, Moscow,
Politizdat, 1970, p 375.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE BATTLE OF MOSCOW

Development of Strategy

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 16-22

[First of eight articles published under the heading "Forty Years After the Battle of Moscow" by Chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces, Col Gen D. Grinkevich: "The Development of Strategy"]

[Text] The Battle of Moscow (30 September 1941--20 April 1942) enriched the theory and practice of Soviet military art and was an important stage in its development. The experience of the battle served largely as a basis in preparing and carrying out subsequent operations to defeat the Nazi hordes. A profound and thorough study of this battle helps in disclosing the significance and influence of it on the course and outcome of the struggle on the Soviet-German Front and in World War II as a whole and provides an opportunity to deduce the necessary lessons for training the staffs and troops under present-day conditions. Here a special place is held by the questions of the development of Soviet military strategy.

By the end of September 1941, that is, at the moment of the direct initiating of the Battle of Moscow, the military-political and strategic situation was particularly difficult for the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. The enemy, regardless of enormous losses, having recovered after the Smolensk Operation, resumed the drive to the east. The Nazi Army as before held the strategic initiative, it had superiority in men and equipment and maintained air supremacy.

After the unsuccessful attempt to break through to the capital of our motherland without halting, the Nazi Command carried out a planned preparation for the offensive against Moscow and this was to be a component part of the large autumn offensive on the Eastern Front. Its aim was to defeat during October the largest groupings of our troops by a crushing, rapid attack on the most important Moscow sector. Combined with simultaneous offensive operations in the northwestern and southwestern strategic sectors of the Soviet-German Front, according to the plans of the Nazi Command, this was to lead to the capturing of the Soviet capital and ensure the victorious completion of the war against the USSR before the onset of winter.

However, these plans were not to come about. In this regard, clearly apparent is the superiority of Soviet military strategy which was based on the Marxist-Leninist

teachings about war and the army and in contrast to the enemy's adventuristic strategy considered the constantly present factors for ensuring a victory in war, the actual situation and the potentials of the sides.

One of the most important manifestations of the maturity of Soviet military strategy was the successful disclosure of the enemy's strategic plan at the outset of the war.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military theory was not confronted with the problem of which method to prefer in conducting armed combat, that is, a strategic offensive or the defensive. The view of the offensive as the main method of combat operations by which alone it was possible to achieve victory in an armed clash remained fixed.

As for the organization and conduct of the defensive, during the prewar period these were viewed on an operational scale. Questions of strategic defense were not posed even on the theoretical level. It was assumed that the rifle troops in the first echelons of the covering armies and the fortified regions in the border districts together with the border troops would check the first enemy thrust while the mechanized corps along with the rifle divisions in the second echelon, with air support, would make powerful counterstrikes and create favorable conditions for the going over of the Soviet troops to a decisive offensive.

The capturing of Moscow and the nation's Central Industrial Area in the plan of the Nazi leadership was the main political and strategic aim of the war against the USSR. However, in prewar times the methods of achieving this were not so apparent while the ideas on the operational-strategic deployment of the Soviet Army along the Western Frontier were laid out on various assumptions. In particular it was assumed that the main forces would be in the Baltic and Western separate military districts. There was also the opinion that the main thrust by the Nazi Army would be expected in the southwest and in accord with this the strongest Soviet troop grouping was to be concentrated in the northwestern part of the Ukraine.

With the outbreak of war it was clearly apparent that the main axis of the Nazi troop offensive was the western (Moscow). Its importance was determined by the fact that it was the shortest route to the most important political, administrative and industrial center, that is, the capital of our state, Moscow. To a significant degree the outcome of the entire campaign depended upon the strength of troop defenses in this strategic sector. But the Soviet troops at this time were scattered along a front of more than 3,000 km and to a depth of 300-400 km. Under the pressure of a superior enemy they were forced, in suffering losses, to retreat into the interior of the nation.

In the developing situation, the Soviet High Command was forced to take a decision to go over to the strategic defensive along the entire Soviet-German Front. On the western (Moscow) strategic sector, in accord with this, during the days which preceded the Moscow Battle, construction was started on a deeply echeloned defense. At the start of October 1941, and in the course of the gigantic battle on this sector, lines and perimeters consisting of several defensive zones were created (behind the troops of the first strategic echelon). These were the defensive line for the basic troop forces of the Reserve Front, the Rzhev-Vyaz'ma Defensive Line, the

Mozhaysk Defensive Line as well as the Moscow Defensive Zone. Thus, a system of fortifications along a front 300-400 km wide and to a depth of up to 300 km was created on the routes of the possible enemy offensive. Here from the very outset of the war, Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] demanded that the commands of the front, in going over to the defensive, make extensive use of man-made obstacles and engineer-designed impediments and build trenches, switch positions, pillboxes and various engineer-designed obstacles. The early creation of defensive lines and the prompt occupying of them by the troops increased the strength of the defensive troops and helped to cause serious losses to the enemy and undermined its offensive plans.

Nevertheless the Soviet troops were unable to repel the strong enemy strikes in the immediate operational depth. The Battle of Moscow showed that the strong enemy assault groupings could be worn down and stopped only by carrying out successive defensive operations. In the western sector these were the defensive operation of the Western Front in the border zone, the Smolensk Battle and the Moscow Defensive Operation.

The birth of a defensive operation by a group of fronts in the course of the Battle of Moscow became a landmark in Soviet military art. While at the outset of the war, in accord with the existing views, one defensive field force was to be deployed on each strategic axis and this force was to conduct a defensive operation in that zone, even the Vyaz'ma Defensive Operation (2-13 October 1941) which developed along a 700-km front involved the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts.

For conducting the defensive operations on the immediate approaches to Moscow, Hq SHC used troops from the Western, Kalinin, the right wing of the Southwestern Fronts, air defense forces covering Moscow, the aviation of the Moscow Military District and the aviation units from the SHC Reserve. Clearly organized cooperation between all the field forces and formations contributed to the successful defense of the city.

In the Battle of Moscow, Hq SHC showed great art and ability in organizing cooperation not only between the fronts involved in one strategic operation but also between the troop groupings deployed in other sectors. During the period of the intense defensive engagements on the immediate approaches to Moscow, Soviet troops went over to active offensive operations in the area of Tikhvin and at Rostov. As a result the Nazi Command was unable to remove a single division from here for reinforcing its troops advancing on Moscow. The experience of organizing cooperation between the fronts and the strategic groupings in the aim of repelling a major enemy offensive has largely maintained its importance under present-day conditions.

Soviet military theoretical thought, in responding actively to events in World War II and particularly considering the experience of the combat operations which developed on the Soviet-German Front, in a short period of time with sufficient fullness was able to define their characteristic traits, to concretize them and provide further development for the major concepts of military art.

On the eve of the battle the principle of massing men and equipment in the main strategic sector fully expressed. On the western (Moscow) strategic sector which comprised around one-fifth of the Soviet-German Front the basic grouping was

concentrated and this included 30 percent of the tank brigades fighting along the entire Soviet-German Front. During the entire engagement such special attention was paid to the Moscow sector.

The SHC reserves played a decisive role in the engagements around Moscow and these reserves were used for restoring a solid front and organizing defenses on new lines, for creating assault groupings and making strong counterstrikes as well as for strengthening the defensive groupings of the fronts fighting on the most dangerous sectors.

In the Battle of Moscow the basic method for conducting the strategic defense was the combining of positional forms of combat operations to hold the major natural and man-made defensive lines as well as the important political and economic centers with the great activity of the defending troops and the broad maneuvering of men and equipment between the strategic sectors or from the interior of the nation. *The effectiveness of strategic defenses* was manifested in the making of air and artillery strikes against the advancing enemy groupings, the carrying out of particular offensive operations and major counterstrikes against the enemy troops and the making of periodic attacks against the airfields, important economic and military objectives in the interior of the enemy-occupied territory. From the experience of the Battle of Moscow in the Great Patriotic War, the stubborn defense of the occupied lines combined with counterstrikes and small-scale offensive operations was the basic method of conducting defensive operations.

In the Battle of Moscow an active defense reduced the momentum of advance of the enemy groupings in October-November to 2.5-3 km per day (in comparison with 30-20 km during the first weeks of the war), it ensured the prompt moving up and strengthening of our troops on the new lines, the wearing down of the enemy and the creating of necessary conditions for further carrying out combat operations.

The massed use of bomber aviation by the belligerents led to the conclusion that it was essential to organize a reliable system of air defense to the entire depth of possible enemy bomber operations. The organization of air defense was based upon the idea of a point coverage of installations by antiaircraft artillery and aviation while troops would be covered directly in their battle formations. The experience of organizing and conducting air defenses for Moscow confirmed the correctness of the ideas according to which air defense for a major strategic objective and troops fighting on the major axes should be organized according to the principle of the massed employment of all air defense means.

The winter campaign of 1941 enriched Soviet military art also in the combat employment of aviation. Even on the eve of the war it was felt that aviation, as an Armed Service, could carry out major operational-strategic missions such as: support (cover) troop operations; fight against enemy operational reserves; disrupt strategic regroupings; by strikes against military and industrial objectives to undermine the enemy's economic might and disrupt its political and military control. Although during the period of the war due to the shortage of forces and the imperfection of the organizational structure it was difficult to mass the aviation, attempts were made to conduct independent air operations.

One of the first was the air operation conducted by Hq SHC on the very eve of the Battle of Moscow involving some 460 aircraft in the area of Yel'nya. In the zone of the Bryansk Front in the summer of 1941 the air forces of several fronts and the long-range bomber aviation operated jointly. Thus, a start was made to actually apply the principles of the massed employment of the air force. In October the aviation of the Western and Bryansk fronts attacked enemy airfields and destroyed a large number of German aircraft. Subsequently, the aviation made a number of attacks against enemy airfields in Finland, against oil refineries in Romania and so forth. All of this had a definite impact upon the conduct of the strategic defensive.

The planned defensive battles and engagements for Moscow demonstrated the unrecanted tenacity and courage, the mass heroism and self-sacrifice of the Soviet soldiers. This was a very important strategic factor in the success of our troops' combat operations. The concrete and purposeful party political work aided significantly in the mass heroism of the men. Relying on the patriotic feelings of the Soviet people, this work was aimed at increasing the combat morale of the personnel, instilling hate for the enemy and eliminating the fear of tanks and aircraft. The political workers played an exceptionally important role in organizing and carrying out this work. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his book "Malaya Zemlya" writes: "...If it is considered that troop morale has always been recognized as a most important factor in troop strength, then during the war years the sharpest weapon was entrusted precisely to the political worker. He tempered the souls and hearts of the men and without this neither our tanks, guns or aircraft would have brought us victory." This was fully apparent also in the Battle of Moscow.

By December 1941, the enemy assault groupings had been ground down and had been stripped of their offensive capabilities. The counteroffensive by Soviet troops at Rostov and Tikhvin as well as the counterstrikes by the Western Front at the end of November near Moscow showed that the initiative had begun to swing to the Soviet Army. The insistent counterstrikes made it possible not only to halt the enemy but also to throw its foremost formations back to the west. *These counterstrikes on 2-3 December 1941 developed into the Soviet Army counteroffensive and this was a decisive battle of the Battle of Moscow.*

Regardless of the still existing superiority of the Nazi troops in personnel and equipment, Hq SHC took a decision to conduct a counteroffensive with the aim of destroying the basic enemy grouping operating in the Moscow sector, to bring about a change in the situation on the front, to seize the strategic initiative and turn the course of the war in its favor. Such a decision was based on a number of circumstances. In the first place, in the previous battles the enemy had been ground down, its offensive drive had been exhausted and the reserves fully used. Secondly, a number of successfully executed counterstrikes, the mass heroism of the men and the commanders, the high morale and the consciousness of our soldiers of their high responsibility for the destiny of the motherland made it possible to realistically count on the success of the counteroffensive.

The preparations for the counteroffensive were carried out during the defensive engagements. By the end of November Hq SHC had secretly concentrated its strategic reserves in the western sector having simultaneously reinforced all three fronts operating on this sector with artillery and mortar formations. The counteroffensive

was planned as a strategic offensive operation by the three fronts in close cooperation with the aviation and the air defense resources of the Moscow Zone. The basic role was assigned to the Western Front as it was to defeat the strongest enemy tank groupings.

The planning and all preparatory measures were carried out during the period of repelling the Nazi offensive, in a short period of time and without operational pauses. At the same time, this was typical for the organization of a counteroffensive. The plan for the strategic operation envisaged the following: by strikes of the troops on the right and left wings of the Western Front in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front, to crush the enemy assault groupings endeavoring to seize Moscow from the north and south, to throw back the Nazis to the west and subsequently defeat the entire Army Group Center. The operation involved virtually all the aviation which had been concentrated by this time on the western sector (the aviation of the Moscow Defensive Zone, the air defense fighter corps, the reserve air groupings of SHC and the long-range bomber aviation).

The Western Front made the main thrust. Headquarters transferred to it from its reserve the first Assault, 10th and 20th armies. In addition, it was reinforced by nine rifle divisions and two cavalry divisions, by eight rifle brigades and six tank brigades. Up to 80 percent of the aviation concentrated around Moscow was assigned to its support.²

During the 25-30 days of the counteroffensive, the Soviet troops crushed the enemy flank groupings and threw them 100-250 km back from Moscow, and by 20 April 1942, 250-350 km. As a result, the threat to the capital had been eliminated and Moscow, Kalininskaya, Tul'skaya, Ryazanskaya and a part of Smolenskaya and Orlovskaya oblasts had been liberated. For the first time in World War II the enemy had suffered a major defeat. This was a fundamental turning point in the course of the war. The Soviet troops, in going over to the counteroffensive, broke the enemy's strategic initiative and altered the course of events in the winter of 1941-1942 in their favor.

The Moscow counteroffensive in terms of the scale, the number of involved fronts and the nature of combat operations was the first strategic offensive operation by the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War.

The phenomena which served the further development of military art were that for the success of the counteroffensive it was essential to concentrate the efforts of the three fronts and to make several coordinated thrusts in a broad zone against the basic enemy assault groupings. For the first time the going over to the counteroffensive was carried out without operational pauses by troops which were not superior in personnel and equipment even on the axes of the main thrust. The choice of the moment for going over to the counteroffensive and the correct assessment of the existing situation showed the increased leadership talent of the Soviet military elite. The prompt and concealed concentration and the training of strategic reserves in the Moscow sector in November-December 1941 and their massed and centralized use for carrying out the main tasks made it possible to achieve the goals of the strategic operation.

In the course of the Battle of Moscow cooperation between Soviet Army units and the partisans was widely developed. For carrying out this the staffs of the fronts and the armies maintained constant contact with them by messengers and by radio and they also sent into the enemy rear their own representatives which were entrusted with the task of coordinating and planning the partisan attacks. A vivid example of such cooperation was the 5-month struggle of the Smolensk patriots together with the operations troop group of Maj Gen P. A. Belov consisting of the I Guards Cavalry Corps.

In the Battle of Moscow for the first time our aviation achieved air supremacy and this contributed significantly to the success of the ground forces. Consequently, for going over to the counteroffensive as a minimum it was essential to win operational air supremacy. This was achieved by involving all the air force and air defense formations concentrated on the Moscow sector.

The experience of the counteroffensive and the strategic offensive operation in January-February 1941 confirmed that for achieving decisive goals it was essential at that time to have armored formations and field forces which possessed high maneuverability and fire power. The committing of the tank formations to the breakthrough made it possible to rapidly develop the offensive, to broaden the front of combat against the enemy, to disorganize troop control and upset the rear lines of communications. The mobile groups created during the period of the Battle of Moscow were unable to fully carry out these missions due to their insufficient number, poor technical equipping and low maneuverability.

Both in the defensive and offensive strategic operations, the greatest significance was given to the questions of troop control. The commands of the fronts and the armies showed great efficiency, knowledge and skill in profoundly analyzing the state of affairs in their zones and in promptly and most effectively organizing combat operations.

In the western strategic sector, the GSC devoted significant attention to centralizing troop control and this best ensured cooperation among the branches of troops and Armed Services. The defensive and particularly the offensive operations demonstrated this. But rigid centralization was carried out chiefly in preparing for an operation. In the course of it the superior staffs, in maintaining the principle of centralized control for the aviation, mobile groups and paratroopers, endeavored to grant subordinate levels initiative within the limits of the overall plan and a unified understanding of the missions.

The first strategic victory won by our Armed Forces demonstrated that Soviet military art could withstand the testing of the war and had made a decisive step forward. In the Battle of Moscow, Soviet military strategy underwent a testing and a development. Here for the first time provisions were worked out on organizing coordinated actions by groups of fronts and a strategic defense with the carrying out of counterstrikes by large forces and a counteroffensive which without an operational pause would develop into a general offensive by the fronts. Regardless of the existing shortcomings, Soviet strategy as a whole successfully carried out the missions confronting the troops and the acquired experience was employed for the further development of military art. This experience is of important significance today. However, it must be perceived through the prism of the new conditions, the new means, the new forms and methods of combat operations.

FOOTNOTES

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya," Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p 24.

² "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945 g." [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1975, p 281.

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Development of Operational Art

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[Article by Professor, Col Gen F. Gayvoronskiy, deputy chief of the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov: "Development of Operational Art"]

[Text] In the Battle of Moscow operational art also developed along with strategy. This article examines certain questions in the development of Soviet operational art and, in particular, the improvement in operational defense, the organization and conduct of offensive operations and troop control and command.

The improvement in operational defense occurred in the direction of increasing the depth of the troop configuration and the engineer organization of the ground; by the intensification of fire (particularly antitank) and engineer-designed obstacles; by increased activity and maneuverability of the troops; by improving the methods of maintaining continuous cooperation among the men and equipment.

Decisiveness and activeness lay at the basis of the goal and overall concept for the front-level defensive operations. Thus, the overall plan of the Western Front commander, Col Gen I. S. Konev, in defending the Rzhev-Vyaz'ma line in September 1941 envisaged the conduct of a stubborn and active defense to hold the tactical defensive zone and prepare for the maneuver of the army and front reserves for destroying the advancing enemy.¹ This same front (the commander from 13 October was Arm Gen G. K. Zhukov) in November, in defending the near-approaches to Moscow, along with stubborn active operations to hold each defensive position and line had the mission of checking the advance of the enemy tank groupings by decisive counterattacks and counterstrikes, by broad maneuvering of the resources and by air and artillery strikes, to cause the enemy heavy losses and thereby to gain time for concentrating and deploying the reserves assigned for the counteroffensive.²

The defensive engagements provided experience in organizing the defenses on a new (Mozhaysk) line directly in the course of repelling the enemy offensive. From 5 October formations from the SHC Reserve began to be sent here as well as the troops which had broken out of the encirclement. However, there were clearly insufficient resources for creating a solid defense and for this reason it was organized for the sectors over which the enemy assault groupings were advancing, that is: the Volokolamsk, Mozhaysk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga.³ The troops concentrated here were organized in four newly formed armies (16th, 5th, 43d and 49th) and these assumed the blow of the arriving enemy groupings.

It must be emphasized that under the conditions of limited resources, the defense also in the field forces was organized according to individual, most important sectors and by creating centers of defense, antitank points and areas. This proved fully effective. For 2 weeks the Nazis endeavored to break through the defenses but, having used up their reserves, were forced to halt the offensive. An enormous role was also played by the stubbornness and steadfastness of the Soviet troops, by the clearly organized cooperation, particularly among the rifle units and sub-units, the tanks, artillery and aviation, and by the firm and effective troop control. Such a method of organizing the defenses was subsequently employed in Stalin-grad in July 1942 and in a number of other operations.

An analysis of the defensive operations shows that with an increased depth of the operational configuration as is shown in the provided table the strength of the defenses was increased. In October, the limited amount of resources and the broad zones forced the Soviet command to deploy the operational field forces in a single echelon and to a shallow depth. In the front a reserve consisting of three-five formations was created and, as a rule, these had suffered losses and were greatly below strength in terms of personnel and weapons. In the armies, one or more rarely two divisions and a small antitank reserve were assigned to the reserve (to the second echelon). The army's depth of defenses was 15-20 km and along the front up to 40-50 km. As a result the defense was not sufficiently strong. In November the fronts also had a single-echelon configuration but the reserves had become stronger. In particular, the reserve of the Western Front included six divisions which were sufficiently strong in terms of personnel and weapons as well as artillery units (chiefly antitank) and engineer equipment. A majority of the armies were formed up in two echelons with two or three divisions in the second echelon, while some, for example the 16th Army, also had a reserve consisting of three cavalry divisions.⁴

The presence of strong second echelons and reserves made it possible to increase the army defensive depth from 15-20 up to 40-50 and more kilometers.⁵

The depth of defenses for the fronts on the major sectors reached 60-80 km. The depth of the engineer organization of the ground was also increased and the quality characteristics of the engineer-designed structures and obstacles were also improved. While in October the armies usually prepared one defensive zone consisting of individual foxholes, communications trenches with machine gun nests, dugouts and on the main sectors also pillboxes, in November a second line was also built. This usually was occupied by troops on individual sectors which intersected the basic lines of communications on the given operational sector.

Significant changes also occurred in the engineer organization of the tactical defensive zone. Individual rifle foxholes began to be interconnected, forming trenches initially within the limits of the positions of the squads, platoons and companies and then also in the battalion defensive areas. For example, the equipping of the defensive zones of the 50th and 32d Rifle Divisions of the 5th Army on the Mozhaysk line with trenches and communications trenches made it possible for them to more successfully repel the enemy offensive.

The experience of the defensive operations at Moscow showed the advisability of building solid trenches with a developed system of communications trenches which provided not only convenient firing and a covered position for the troops but also made it possible to maneuver the men and equipment both along the front and in depth.

During the following years of the war, a system of trenches, as the basis for the engineer organization of the positions, was widely developed not only in organizing the defenses but also in preparing the jump-off positions for an offensive under conditions of direct contact with the enemy.

The increased depth in the operational configuration of the troops and the improved engineer organization of the ground significantly increased the stability and impassability of the defenses.

The basic directions in the development of antitank defenses were an increase in their depth and the more effective use of weapons for countering enemy tanks (artillery of all calibers, tanks, man-made obstacles and infantry antitank weapons). In October the antitank defenses were organized chiefly on a tactical scale, while in November, on a tactical and operational up to a front, inclusively. This defense was based on the antitank and engineer reserves (and in a number of divisions and armies on the mobile obstacle construction detachments) on the likely tank approaches. In the armies, from 3 to 6 antitank areas were organized and in the fronts from 10 to 18 consisting of at least an artillery regiment each.

The conduct of defensive operations was characterized by a desire of the commanders and the staffs to make army and front-level counterstrikes, to hit the advancing Nazi groupings with artillery and air power, to widely maneuver the men and equipment and employ the second echelons and reserves for increasing the depth of defense on the major sectors. The effectiveness of the counterstrikes gradually increased. Thus, while the counterstrike of the Western Front of 3-4 October in the area of Dukhovskchina against the basic forces of the enemy 9th Army and Third Tank Group did not lead to positive results, at the end of October counterstrikes by this same front in the area of Dimitrov, Krasnaya Polyana, Lobnya and at Kashira not only halted the enemy advance and threw it back to the west in individual sectors but also ensured the going over to a decisive counteroffensive.

As a whole in the preparations for and in the course of defensive operations, the following trends were most clearly apparent: the early preparation of the defensive line and the occupying of them by the troops; the improving of the operational configuration by increasing its depth and by creating strong second echelons and reserves; increasing the role of antitank defenses and engineer organization of the ground; concentrating the basic efforts of the defending troops in the sectors of the main enemy strikes; increasing the activeness and maneuverability of the defenses. These trends were developed in subsequent operations and have maintained their significance under present-day conditions.

In the defensive operations, the methods of troop control were improved and this was expressed in the increased working precision of the staffs, in the more specific issuing of missions to the troops, in the improved control over the carrying out of the issued orders and in the improved organization of cooperation and all-round support. The commander of the front (army) was the basic organizer of the operation. On the basis of his instructions, the staffs ensured that the adopted plan was carried out and they organized all-round support and control of the troops. Thus, Gen. G. K. Zhukov, K. K. Rokossovskiy, L. A. Govorov, I. G. Zakharkin and others took a personal part in the working out of the operations and provided direct and concrete leadership of the troops in the course of their execution.

Troop control gradually became more stable and continuous, direct and firm. While in the first half of October, because of the extremely difficult situation and the forced retreat of our troops, control was often disrupted and restored with great difficulty, while in the second half of November the level of control rose significantly. This was achieved by the integrated use of the telephone, telegraph and mobile means of communications (motor vehicles and motorcycles), mounted messengers and field liaison officers. In those instances when communications were temporarily disrupted in certain armies, control was assumed by the staffs of the fronts. During a period of acute situations, the commander and staff of a front were directly linked to the formation commanders and gave them combat orders in simultaneously informing the army command and staffs of them.

The experience of the offensive operations on the Moscow sector provided a powerful impetus to the development of Soviet operational art in the following areas: improving the methods of defeating the strongest enemy groupings; the skillful choice of the axes of the main thrusts and the bold massing of men and equipment; the achieving of surprise in going over to the counteroffensive; improving the methods of breaking through enemy defenses as well as the employment of the branches of troops, better cooperation and control; the use of paratroopers for increasing the momentum of advance and shifting the effort in depth.

The goals and overall plans of the front-level offensive operations stemmed from the goals of the strategic operations of groups of fronts. Here the main thing was to increase the decisiveness and results of combat operations by the field forces. For example, in November 1941, in going over to a counteroffensive, the Western Front was confronted with the task of defeating the strongest and most dangerous enemy tank groupings and lifting the direct threat to Moscow. The surprise going over to a counteroffensive, the committing of additional forces and the stubbornness and tenacity of our troops made it possible to carry this out brilliantly. On 7 January 1942, the troops of the Western Front together with those of the Kalinin Front, were to surround, split up and destroy the basic forces of the Army Group Center in the area of Rzhev, Vyaz'ma, Iukhnov and Gzhatsk.⁶ However, the enemy was able to quickly bring up large reserves, create a strong defense and win air supremacy. The limited amount of artillery and tanks among the advancing troops as well as interruptions in the delivery of ammunition and fuel impeded the further carrying out of the offensive and did not make it possible to fully complete the set tasks. Subsequently, due to the increased combat capabilities of the troops, to the organization of second echelons and large operational reserves as well as to the acquired combat experience, the operations began to be conducted with a more decisive goal and greater effectiveness.

An important condition for a successful counteroffensive was its concealed preparations and the surprise going over to the offensive. This was of exceptional significance for achieving success under conditions when none of the three fronts in going over to a counteroffensive possessed superiority over the enemy. Moreover our troops were 1.5-fold weaker than the enemy in terms of personnel, 1.4-fold for artillery and 1.6-fold for tanks.⁷ Only for the aviation considering the obsolete aircraft types was superiority on the side of our troops. This ensured the winning of operational air supremacy on the Moscow sector. The experience gained in the concealed preparation and surprise of the attack for the enemy completely confirmed the inspired words of V. I. Lenin on the need "to endeavor to catch the enemy off

ward and to seize the moment when its troops are scattered,"² and in our specific example before the enemy could organize a strong defense. The command of the fronts and the armies made skillful use of surprise in committing the new forces to the engagement, in choosing the time for going over to decisive offensive operations, in selecting the place for making the attacks and in determining the methods of combat operations. Subsequently this experience was widely employed in the Stalingrad counteroffensive and in the operations of 1943-1945.

In the Moscow offensive, the fronts and armies with a single-echelon (the armies sometimes had also second echelons) configuration made several attacks: the main one and one or two auxiliary ones. In December 1941, when the enemy still had not been able to create a strong defense, this method produced positive results, the enemy suffered great losses and was forced to retreat. In January 1942, when the Nazis were able to bring up reserves and organize a defense, the Soviet troops, in advancing continuously, suffered high losses and, having used up the reserves, were greatly weakened. An offensive along several axes led to a scattering of the forces, to a weakening of the assault groupings and to a reduced momentum of advance.

The sectors of the main thrusts for the fronts were determined by Hq SHC and for the armies or the front. These strikes were made against the most vulnerable places in the enemy defense and in sectors having crucial significance for defeating the main enemy groupings (the Western Front in December 1941). This was typical for a majority of the operations. In the course of an offensive for destroying the enemy groupings around Moscow, extensive use was made of the method of splitting, cutting up and subsequently destroying these groupings.

The various methods elaborated by combat practice for defeating the enemy and the skillful choice of the axes of the main thrusts have maintained their importance under present-day conditions. However, at present it is essential to consider the new weapons and the new qualities of the troops which can make fundamental changes in the process of organizing and conducting the operations.

In the preparation of offensive operations, the commanders and staffs of the field forces mastered the art of massing the resources on the crucial sectors. This was particularly crucial in January 1942 when the troops were forced to break through a prepared defense. While on an average the operational artillery density in the offensive operations was 10 and more guns and mortars per kilometer of front, in the sector of the main thrusts this was increased up to 35-40 and in January 1942, even to 50. By weakening the secondary sectors the commanders endeavored to increase the operational densities along the axes of the main thrusts (see the table).

The experience of organizing and carrying out the breakthrough of a defense was first gained in the Moscow Battle. Its successful outcome was the result of dependable neutralization of the enemy defenses, the massing of men and equipment on the selected sectors and the able use of mobile troops, mainly cavalry formations, for developing the breakthrough in depth and in the second echelons and reserves toward the flanks. Such a method was employed in January 1942 on the Lama River by the troops of the 20th, 1st Assault and 16th armies of the Western Front. Only the lack of more powerful mobile (tank) formations, poor artillery and air support for the troops in depth, large interruptions in supplying ammunition to the troops and

Table

**Scope of Army Operations and Operational Troop Density
in Battle of Moscow***

Время проведения операции	Но- мер ар- мии	Разм.х операций **				Оперативная плотность ***			Темп наступле- ния, км/сут
		ширина полосы обороны (наступ- ления), км	глубина оперативно- го построения (на- ступления), км	уз- сток про- рыва, км	про- дол- жи- тель- ность, сут	км на одну дивизию	ору- дия и мино- метов (на 1 км фрон- та)	тан- ков (на 1 км фрон- та)	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Def. operations									
Oct 1941	29	80	15	—	—	20	5.8	—	—
Oct 1941	43	60	20	—	—	15	4	0.5	—
Nov 1941	16	70	40	—	—	11.6	9.3	1.2	—
Off. operations									
Dec 1941	30	80	$\frac{35}{35}$	—	$\frac{3}{9}$	$\frac{8.0}{—}$	$\frac{10.0}{—}$	$\frac{1.0}{—}$	$\frac{12}{4}$
Dec 1941	10	100	$\frac{60}{60}$	—	$\frac{5}{8}$	$\frac{9.0}{—}$	$\frac{10.5}{—}$	—	$\frac{12}{7-8}$
Jan 1942	20	20	$\frac{20}{50}$	8	$\frac{2}{15}$	$\frac{3.0}{1.5}$	$\frac{25.0}{54.0}$	$\frac{5.0}{12.0}$	$\frac{10}{3-4}$

* See B. I. Nevzorov, "Razvitiye sovetskogo voyennogo iskusstva v pervom periode Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny" [The Development of Soviet Military Art in the First Period of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Publication of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, 1978, pp 20-21, 32.

** The scope of operations. The numerator gives the planned and the denominator the actual.

*** Operational density. The numerator shows in the zone of advance and the denominator in the breakthrough area.

Key: 1--Time of operation; 2--Number of army; 3--Width of defensive (offensive) zone, km; 4--Depth of operational configuration (offensive), km; 5--Breakthrough area, km; 6--Duration, days; 7--Kilometers per division; 8--Guns and mortars (per km of front); 9--Tanks (per km of front); 10--Momentum of advance, km per day.

other shortcomings did not make it possible for the armies to achieve greater results. It must be emphasized that the successful breakthrough of enemy defenses on the Lama River and subsequently was aided by carrying out the demands contained in the directive letter of Hq SHC of 10 January 1942.⁹ This pointed out that for carrying out a breakthrough it was essential to create powerful assault groupings,

to replace the artillery softening up with an artillery offensive and to continuously provide fire support for the infantry and the tanks until the complete crossing of the enemy defenses.

The principle of the massing of men and equipment in the sector of the main thrust became the most important one in all the subsequent operations of the past war and undoubtedly was kept its significance under present-day conditions.

An analysis of the offensive operations shows that for successfully breaking through an enemy defense it is essential not only to dependably neutralize the defense but also carry out the offensive at a rapid pace so that the enemy is unable to regroup its troops and organize a defense in depth; the breakthrough must be broadened toward the flanks; the enemy reserves must be prevented from reaching the breakthrough sectors; there must be dependable cover for the troops, particularly the main forces, against air strikes. Under present-day conditions, in an offensive employing conventional weapons, for a breakthrough it may also be necessary to involve large masses of artillery, aviation and tanks, to ensure the dependable neutralization of numerous antitank weapons and provide air cover including against strikes by gunships. For increasing the momentum of advance and preventing the approach of enemy reserves to the breakthrough areas it is essential to make missile and air strikes over the entire depth of the area as well as widely employ paratroopers. The experience of employing paratroopers in the Battle of Moscow showed the need for making the landing quickly in order not to lose the surprise factor, the enemy should be neutralized in the landing area and near it while reconnaissance must precisely establish the enemy resources in the landing area.

Both on the defense and on the offense, troop control was improved. At the start of a counteroffensive missions were given, as a rule, to the armies and divisions for 1 or a maximum of 2 days. Under the conditions of rapid and abrupt changes in the situation (and this often led to a temporary disruption of communications), this method impeded the initiative of subordinate commanders. It was better to give the formations their missions for several days with an orientation on the immediate missions of the army (the 16th Army of Lt Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy). This made it possible for the commanders to show initiative within the overall concept of the operation even under the conditions of a temporary loss of contact with senior chiefs.

In the aim of maintaining strict secrecy, all secret orders and instructions were ordinarily transmitted to executors verbally. During the period of a regrouping and the taking up of the jump-off position by the troops, the use of radios was prohibited. In the staffs and headquarters all particularly important operational documents, plans and calculations relating to the preparations for an operation were written out by hand.¹⁰

In a complicated and rapidly changing situation, there was the widespread practice of issuing brief battle orders which were transmitted over communications equipment as well as by the field liaison officers and messengers by aircraft, motor vehicles and motorcycles. These orders were marked by their terseness and often were plotted on a map. Control was also exercised by personal conversations of the commanders (chiefs of staff) over the telephone or telegraph, by the issuing of written instructions as well as by brief trips to the command posts of the field forces, formations and units.

As a whole, Soviet operational art in the Battle of Moscow underwent further development. Many of its provisions were improved in subsequent operations. The experience gained was used after the conclusion of the Great Patriotic War and remains pertinent under present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 208, inv. 10169, file 30, sheets 111-112.
- ² Ibid., sheets 112-121.
- ³ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 4, p 98.
- ⁴ TsAMO SSSR, folio 208, inv. 4537, file 6, sheets 97-99.
- ⁵ "Razgrom nemetsko-fashistskikh voysk pod Moskvoy" [Defeat of the Nazi Troops at Moscow], Voenizdat, 1964, p 69.
- ⁶ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 4, p 307.
- ⁷ Ibid., p 284.
- ⁸ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 34, p 383.
- ⁹ See "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Operational Documents of the Great Patriotic War], No 5, Voenizdat, 1947, pp 8-10.
- ¹⁰ "Directive of the Western Front of 1 April 1942" (TsAMO SSSR, folio 208, inv. 10170, file 2, sheets 38-40).

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Development of Offensive Tactics

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 30-38

[Article by Professor, Lt Gen V. Reznichenko, deputy chief of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR and Doctor of Military Sciences: "The Development of Offensive Combat Tactics"]

[Text] The offensive period in the Battle of Moscow commenced, as Mar SU G. K. Zhukov has recalled, when the Nazi troops lost their offensive capability. Without being able to regroup for the defensive, they were forced to counter our thrust in unprepared positions. The going over of the Soviet Army from the defensive to a counteroffensive without an operational pause favored the making of surprise attacks but also complicated troop actions. The high losses, the low level of weapons and

equipment in the units and formations and the strong moral-psychological and physical strain of the defensive battles substantially impeded the offensive. The Soviet troops went over to an offensive against an enemy which had 1.6-fold more tanks and 1.4-fold more artillery.

Such unusual conditions for an offensive provide rich material for studying the methods of going over to it with limited men and equipment and for conducting combat operations during the day and at night. This is also of extremely important significance under present-day conditions. An analysis of troop operations in a counteroffensive (December 1941--beginning of January 1942) and in a general offensive (January--April 1942) makes it possible to trace the changes in offensive combat tactics and disclose the trends of its development.

The choice of the axis of the main thrust and the massing of men and equipment on it were carried out differently although the commanders of the formations and units endeavored to carry out the prewar theoretical recommendations on the making of the main thrust against the weakest point with the maximum possible number of men and equipment. But this was not always possible. Thus, in December 1941, often there was not time to carry out a regrouping of the troops. For example, the commander of the 50th Rifle Division, Maj Gen N. F. Lebedenko, during the day of 10 December received the mission of giving up the defensive zone by 1900 hours and at 0600 hours of the following day by a surprise attack to break through the enemy defenses in the new zone. In this combat there was no clearly expressed axis for the main thrust. The overall densities of men and equipment per kilometer of front were low (see the table). And there was an even distribution of the resources along the front. Each rifle regiment, including the second echelon had an artillery infantry support group consisting of one battalion.

But in January 1942, regardless of the fact that our units and formations suffered great losses and the enemy's defenses had become significantly stronger, the massing of men and equipment on the main sector was intensified. Thus, the 352d Rifle Division by 3 January 1942 had only 90-125 men in each of the regiments, while the enemy's tactical densities per kilometer of front were: 1.1 battalion, 22 guns and mortars and 6 tanks.¹ However, with the receiving of reinforcements by the formation, 1.5 rifle battalions and 70 guns and mortars were concentrated on the main sector per kilometer of front (considering the supporting army long-range artillery group). One must also note the creative approach of the division commander, Col Yu. M. Prokof'yev, to the choice of the main thrust's axis, around Timonino to the north (see the diagram).

The question of the massing of men and equipment began to be solved particularly successfully with the receiving of the directive letter of Hq SHC of 10 January 1942 on actions by assault groups and the organization of an artillery offensive and the order of Hq SHC of 22 January 1942 on the combat employment of the tank units and formations. The zones of advance for the divisions and regiments were reduced by 2-3-fold in the main sectors of an army offensive (as a rule, they became 2 and 1 km respectively). If the zones of advance were larger, the divisions were assigned breakthrough areas and this made it possible to increase the tactical densities of the resources per kilometer of front up to 2-3 rifle battalions, 40-70 guns and mortars and up to 5 tanks.

Basic Indicators for Offensive Combat of Rifle Divisions in Battle of Moscow*

Army number, date	Div. number	Reinforcements	depth of mission		density per km of front		battle formation echelons		artillery Group	8	pace (km/day)	Note
			a	b c	d	e f	1st	2nd				
Counteroffensive (6 Dec 41--7 Jan 42)												
5th Dec 1941	30 ca	160 c6 2 572 tan 2 rw 920	8	10 km	1.2	7.2	1.5	1.5	100-3	15	0.2	4--
10th Dec 1941	12 ca	—	14	4 km (warp no 3-3)	0.5	—	—	1085 ca 1089 ca	100-3	10	2	14
10th Dec 1941	30 ca	—	18	7 km (warp no 3-3)	0.5	5.2	—	1111 ca 1113 ca	100-3	10	7	17
Offensive on western sector (8 Jan--20 Apr 1942)												
4th Ass. Jan 1942	240 ca	67 68 c6 1333 can6 171 or6 204 rw 910	13 ca**	3-4	8-12	0.9	5.6	921 ca 925 ca 917 ca	100-2	120	11	12
20th Jan 1942	62 ca	337 nan 2 rw 920	1.5	1	7-8	1.5	70	1160 ca 1158 ca	100-2 100-1	90	2	6

* TsAMO SSSR, folio 737, inv. 11350s, file 4, sheets 22-29; folio 787, inv. 10266s, file 4, sheets 43-56; folio 367, inv. 4788, file 47, sheets 37-46; folio 1410, inv. 7535, file 1, sheets 304-306; folio 1636, inv. 1, file 13, sheets 9-16; folio 353, inv. 5866, file 597, sheets 18-25; folio 1635, inv. 1, file 7, sheets 12; folio 1636, inv. 1, file 12, sheets 12-18.

** In the numerator, width of zone of advance; in denominator, breakthrough sector.
Key: a--width of zone of offensive, km; b--near; c--following (by end of day); d--rifle battalions; e--guns & mortars (76-mm & above); f--tanks; g--duration of artillery softening up, min.; h--in breakthrough; i--in pursuit; j--march approach; k--offensive without pause; l--171st tk. btl. arrived only on 3 Dec. Units: ca--rifle division; cn--rifle regiment; c6p--rifle brigade; ran--howitzer art. reg.; nan--cannon art. reg.; ra. mn--rocket btl.; n6--ski btl.; can6--combat engr. btl.; or6--sep. tank btl.; 100--anti-infantry; 100-1--long-range; c6--rifle btl.

The depth of the combat missions was also changed. While in December the rifle divisions were given combat missions to defeat the opposing enemy and capture a line at a depth up to 15-20 km by the end of the first day and the capturing of a line to a depth of up to 6 km was given as the immediate mission (this was not always set), in January these indicators were substantially lowered. The immediate mission for a division was set to a depth of 1-3 km and the further mission (by the end of the day) to 8 km.

These changes were brought about by the improvement of enemy defenses in December 1941. As a rule, the main zone was 5-6 km in depth and organized according to the principle of company strongpoints and battalion areas set up predominantly in population points. The strongpoints had a well developed network of trenches and a well organized fire plan. The spaces between them were covered by submachine gun sub-units, by flanking and overlapping machine gun fire, by artillery, minefields and wire obstacles. Alternate firing positions were built for the machine guns, guns and mortars while a portion of the weapons was positioned on the backsides of hills. The battle formation of the units and formations was organized in two echelons.

It was very difficult to break through such a defense which had a higher density of men and equipment per kilometer of front for certain indicators (for tanks) than did the advancing side and at first the formations and units did not carry out their combat missions in the counteroffensive. The momentum of advance rarely exceeded 1 or 2 km a day.

There was one other reason for the changes, namely the low strike force of the rifle divisions and regiments due to the limited amount of artillery, ammunition and the absence, alas not rarely, of tanks.

Thus, in the course of the offensive at Moscow there was a reduced depth in the combat missions of the units and formations but this must be viewed as a particular phenomenon caused by the specific conditions of the situation. Subsequently, in keeping with the improved technical outfitting of the regiments and divisions and their greater strike force, the depth of the missions and the momentum of advance began to rise.

One must also note the following trend in assigning combat missions to the formations. While in December these most often were not divided into particular ones which were to be carried out successively, in January this became the rule as the division's combat mission began to be divided into the immediate and subsequent (the day's mission). This was related both to the nature of enemy defenses and to the degree of the disclosure of its installations by our intelligence. Analysis showed that the deeper the defenses and the greater the density of the men and equipment occupying them and the higher the degree of discovering such defenses, the more probable the need and possibility of dividing the combat mission of a division and regiment.

The battle formations of the formations and units were also improved. In December 1941, as a rule these were formed up in two echelons with the assigning of artillery infantry support groups for the number of regiments in the first echelon of the divisions as well as sometimes a divisional long-range artillery group. For reinforcing the formations with tanks, they formed a group of close support tanks. The

deep echeloning of the battle formations frequently was not caused by the situation as the enemy defenses were of a focal nature and were taken up hurriedly. Moreover, the echeloning impeded the massing of fire by the rifle subunits and units and weakened the force of the initial blow as often 8 of the 27 rifle companies fought in the division's first echelon.


This was understood by many formation and unit commanders. When, for example, the commander of the 331st Rifle Division [sd] of the 20th Army, Maj Gen F. P. Korol', received the mission to defeat the enemy in a strongly fortified enemy defensive center at Krasnaya Polyana, he, knowing that the enemy did not have reserves nearby, set the battle formation in a single echelon and determined the outcome of the engagement with a powerful initial strike.

In the January and subsequent offensive operations, the formation commanders began to organize the battle formations more diversely and considering the specific situation, to more clearly determine the grouping for making the main thrust and when necessary assigning forward detachments (the 50th sd of the 5th Army), special detachments for nighttime operations in the enemy rear (formations of the 10th Army), artillery antitank reserves (the 82d Motorized Rifle Division of the 5th Army and the 413th sd of the 50th Army) as well as unique mobile obstacle construction detachments. The commander of the 352d sd, for example, in organizing the offensive, on 7 January 1941 ordered one combat engineer platoon with mines to be assigned to each regiment for repelling counterattacks by enemy tanks.²

The experience of the offensive at Moscow showed that with the going over to maneuvering actions, the forward detachments become a requisite element in a division's battle formation. Most often they were a rifle or ski battalion. The cutting of the enemy's escape routes and the seizing of advantageous lines, objectives or crossings were the most characteristic tasks for them. In cooperating with the mobile groups of the armies and with the paratroopers, they disrupted enemy defenses, sowed panic in its ranks and created conditions for the encirclement and destruction of the enemy.

The artillery in the December offensive battles was employed, as a rule, on a centralized basis by the divisional commanders who organized infantry support groups. This restricted the possibilities of the regimental commanders and impeded the maintaining of artillery cooperation with the infantry and tanks. The artillery softening up for an attack was carried out to a shallow depth in the form of a brief 10- or 15-minute intensive shelling while artillery support for an infantry and tank attack and the supporting of them in depth were not planned at all. With low artillery densities this did not ensure the dependable neutralization of the enemy defenses and their breaking through was usually carried out slowly at a pace of 0.8-1 km per day.

From January 1942, the artillery began to be used on a massed basis and its density per kilometer of breakthrough sector and the duration of the preparatory firing were increased. The troops moved from artillery softening up to an artillery offensive and from brief single actions by the artillery prior to the offensive to continuous support for the infantry and tank offensive to the entire depth of the enemy defenses.



Improvement in Offensive Combat (from Experience of 20th Army Formations)

Key: a--indicators; b--width of zone of advance; c--immediate mission; d--further mission; e--guns and mortars (per km of front); f--tanks (per km of front); g--artillery softening up (minutes/depth--km); h--artillery support of attack (method/km); i--artillery support; j--division number; k--call-in; l--successive concentration of fire/ to 1.5; m--concentration of fire/call in.

units: сд--rifle division; сн--rifle regiment; рп. див--long-range artillery group; рп. див--anti-infantry artillery group.

Virtually in all armies for direct laying they began to employ the guns of not only the regimental and antitank artillery but also the divisional and sometimes army artillery.

The advantages of the new system for employing the artillery in combat were apparent. This is clearly seen from comparing its utilization in the offensive, for example, of the 50th Rifle Division in December 1941 and the 352d Rifle Division of 10-15 January 1942. While in the former instance the artillery was distributed evenly with a density of 7.2 guns per km of front, it was used on a decentralized basis and only a brief artillery softening up was planned (15 minutes) to a depth of 1 km, in the second it was massed with a density of 70 guns and mortars per kilometer of front, the artillery softening up for the attack was planned to be 90 minutes long (five intense shellings with two spurious shifts of fire) to a depth of 2-3 km, support for the attack was to employ the method of the successive concentration of fire to a depth of 1.5 km while the support for the infantry advance was to be by concentrated fire upon request from the combined-arms commanders.⁴ The neutralization of the enemy and the cooperation of the artillery with the infantry to the depth of the immediate mission were particularly well organized. The momentum of advance for the 352d Rifle Division was 2.5 km per hour, while the 50th Rifle Division advanced 3-fold more slowly and carried out the mission set for it for a day of combat over a period of several days.

There is no doubt that such trends in the development of the combat employment of artillery at Moscow as its massing, the continuity of fire support, the increased role of direct laying and the creation of special artillery reserves for combating tanks have maintained their importance under present-day conditions as well.

In a winter offensive *engineer support* was also of great significance. Due to the lack of equipment, engineer measures, as a rule, were carried out on a decentralized basis in the regiments and divisions. The combat engineer subunits conducted reconnaissance of the routes, they cleared the routes of advance, laid column tracks, built passageways through enemy minefields, snow-ice and other obstacles, they put up crossings over rivers and ravines and made skis, sleds for mortars, toboggans for machine guns and artilleries and wooden triangles to clear the roads of snow.

An offensive disclosed the need for increasing the engineer preparation of all the troops and the increased role of the engineer subunits in combating enemy tanks and in ensuring the boundary lines and flanks. In the Moscow Battle new engineer elements in the divisional battle orders arose and these subsequently became the mobile obstacle construction detachments.

On the employment of tanks. The offensive by our troops at Moscow started under conditions when not only the divisions but also the armies did not have tanks or there were very few of them (30-50 units of armor).⁵ The only exception was the 5th Army which had 90 tanks and the 16th Army with 125 tanks.⁶ Nevertheless the experience of their combat employment is largely instructive.

In the first place, there were confirmed the ever-growing importance of tanks in an engagement and an operation and the correctness of our prewar views on their massed use for close infantry support in breaking through enemy defenses at a rapid pace and for rapid operations in depth as part of an echelon for exploiting the success.

Secondly, combat experience showed that the best form for such an echelon was the mobile groups which were based on large tank and cavalry formations. Everyone knows the glorious combat deeds of the II Guards Cavalry Corps under Maj Gen L. M. Doyator. Reinforced by the 20th and 22d Tank brigades and the 16th Guards Rocket Battalion, it, comprising the mobile group of the 5th Army, made a raid in the enemy rear and had a great impact on the defeat of the Istra enemy grouping. But what would have happened to the mobile group without tanks when it met the enemy tank reserves far behind the lines!

The experience of the Battle of Moscow is also instructive in the use of tanks as a means for reinforcing the rifle divisions where the tanks were employed not only for close support but also for independently carrying out tasks to break through the intermediate enemy defensive lines without a halt, for conducting pursuit and for actions in forward detachments. Remarkable examples of boldness, courage and initiative in carrying out such missions were demonstrated by the Tank Troops of the 8th Tank Brigade of Col P. A. Rotmistrov and the 21st Tank Brigade of Lt Col A. L. Lesovoy in surrounding and defeating the Klin enemy grouping; by the 31st Tank Brigade of Col A. G. Kravchenko in liberating Solnechnogorsk and many, many others. The tanks gave dynamicness and maneuverability to offensive combat and they were one of the most important means for carrying out the plans of the commanders to encircle the enemy.

Of course, there were also shortcomings in the employment of tanks. The order of Hq SHC of 22 January 1944 pointed to the basic ones, including: breaking up the tank units into small subunits which did not make it possible to mass the tanks on the main sectors; the absence of close cooperation between the tanks, the infantry and artillery; the absence of tank escort weapons and poor reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain in the sectors where the tank formations and units were to be committed to an engagement. Due to the complete consideration and analysis of these in subsequent engagements the tank troops were employed more skillfully in battle and an operation.

The nature of offensive combat was characterized by decisiveness, by great dynamicness, by troop operations along axes with intervals and exposed flanks, and by the desire to encircle and destroy the enemy in the course of breaking through the enemy defenses and to develop the offensive. The enemy was defeated in this manner in the city of Mikhaylov by the 330th Rifle Division of Col G. D. Sokolov (6 December 1941) in Kryukovo (7-8 December) by the 8th Guards Rifle and 44th Cavalry divisions (commanders, Maj Gen V. A. Revyakin and Col P. F. Kuklin).

An interesting decision was made by the commander of the 8th Guards Rifle Division to defeat the enemy in Kryukovo. The plan for combat envisaged a combination of the outflanking of the Kryukovo defensive center by the basic forces to the north-west and an attack by a portion of the forces from the front. The resources were allocated in accord with this: with an average tactical density of 1.5 battalion, around 20 guns and mortars and 3.3 tanks per kilometer of front while on the right flank two regiments echeloned in depth advanced in a front 1 km wide. Their actions were supported by three artillery battalions and this made it possible to create a density of up to 40 guns and mortars per kilometer of front here.⁷

Nighttime combat operations were also widely employed on an offensive. Practice showed that with good preparations for a night attack, the probability of success increased while losses from fire were reduced. The night contributed to the concealed execution of the maneuver and to the rapid defeat of the defending enemy. Thus, on 7 December 1941, the 328th Rifle Division (commander, Col P. A. Yerebin) several times attacked the enemy strongpoint in Gremyachiy but was unsuccessful. The outflanking movement to the north and south undertaken with the onset of darkness produced a positive result as the enemy threatened with encirclement abandoned the village and retreated rapidly.⁹ As a result of successful nighttime offensives such towns as Kryukovo, Mikhaylov, Tarusa, Bogoroditsk, Plavsk, Masal'sk and others were liberated and the Nazi defensive lines running along the Protva, Nara, Upa and Plava rivers were breached.

An important area for improving the methods of conducting an offensive was the extensive use of mobile groups, forward and special detachments in conducting nighttime raiding operations in the enemy rear. Thus, the commander of the 10th Army, Lt Gen F. I. Golikov, ordered that each battalion, regiment and division have detachments of bold commanders and soldiers so as to penetrate the enemy rear at night, destroy enemy personnel and combat equipment, to harass it and spread panic.

The above-mentioned groups and detachments together with the paratroopers which also were employed for the first time in the Battle of Moscow provided experience for improving the theory of combat and an operation in depth. Unfortunately, the limited amount of weapons, equipment, tank formations, aviation and paratroopers at that time did not make it possible to fully utilize their intrinsic capabilities but the disclosed development trends in offensive combat opened up the paths to further improving the methods of conducting it and for developing tactics. These have kept their importance for present-day conditions. Among the basic trends one should mention the following.

1. The changed nature of offensive combat in the direction of a continuous rise in the decisiveness of its goals and the increased role of the maneuver to surround the enemy. The basic factors determining such development of combat were: the increased fire, strike and maneuvering capabilities of the troops and the increased technical equipping of the subunits, units and formations.
2. The missing of men and equipment on the main sector. Here there constantly was a trend to concentrate weapons above all in the aim of securely neutralizing the enemy artillery and tanks first in the interests of increasing the strike force of the attacking troops and for rapidly developing the tactical success into an operational one.
3. The increased depth and duration of fire neutralization of the enemy. The brief artillery softening up was replaced by an artillery offensive which ensured the required preparatory firing for the attack and the continuous fire support for the infantry and tank offensive to the entire depth of the enemy defenses. The importance of aviation also increased in carrying out fire tasks, particularly in supporting troops which were conducting fluid operations.
4. The increased proportional amount, role and importance of fluid, maneuvering combat operations during an offensive as well as a nighttime offensive. There was

a trend toward the crossing of enemy defensive lines in depth and the crossing of water obstacles without a halt.

5. The increased number of elements in a division's battle formation. In keeping with the increase in the units of armor in the enemy defenses, the artillery anti-tank reserves and mobile obstacle construction detachments became permanent elements in the battle formations of the combined-arms formations.

6. The increased role in the forward detachments of the divisions in conducting fluid operations as one of the important factors in achieving a high momentum of advance.

7. The improved methods for conducting an offensive by the wider employment of aviation for troop support, the employment of forward and special detachments and the able use of the successful operations of army mobile groups and paratroopers.

8. The increased direct dependence of an offensive engagement's success upon the training level of the commanders and staffs. The lower this level the higher the level of control centralization there should be.

These trends were developed in the subsequent periods of the Great Patriotic War. The skillful employment of them made it possible to carry out the combat missions more adroitly and in the postwar times, with the introduction of new weapons, to more successfully elaborate new, more advanced methods for conducting offensive combat. In this lies their permanent importance for today.

The Battle of Moscow was an outstanding period in the development of tactics and it, together with the other components of Soviet military art, made a marked contribution to the winning of victory.

This became possible due to the constant active and purposeful party political work which indoctrinated our men in a spirit of total dedication to the CPSU and the socialist motherland, steadfastness and tenacity on the defensive and activeness and decisiveness on the offensive.

It would be difficult to overestimate that truly titanic work which was carried out on all levels by the command, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations to instill confidence in the men that the armored hordes of Nazi troops which had easily rolled over the fields of Western Europe could not only be stopped but also defeated. The personal example of the communists was one of the effective forms for mobilizing the troops to carry out such actions. Their steadfastness, courage and military skill strengthened morale and gave rise to mass heroism and creativity in carrying out the combat missions.

The victory at Moscow was achieved because the men and commanders quickly mastered the new military equipment which the motherland presented them, they mastered the science of winning and creatively approached the search for the best ways to carry out combat missions. These also are permanent factors which have kept their importance under present-day conditions, too.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ TsAMO SSSR, folio 373, inv. 9681, file 10, sheets 25-27.
- ² Ibid., folio 906, inv. 1115, file 1, sheet 74; folio 1635, inv. 1, file 7, sheet 12; folio 783, inv. 10268, file 4, sheet 107; folio 1410, inv. 8, file 3, sheet 53.
- ³ Ibid., folio 373, inv. 8823, file 1, sheets 28-35.
- ⁴ Ibid., folio 353, inv. 5866, file 597, sheet 127.
- ⁵ Ibid., folio 358, inv. 5931, file 4, sheet 188.
- ⁶ Ibid., folio 783, inv. 10268, file 1, sheet 107.
- ⁷ Ibid., folio 353, inv. 5886, file 592, sheet 29; folio 1254, inv. 1, file 11, sheet 63.

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Employment of Air Forces

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 39-45

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Chief Mar Avn P. Kutakhov, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense: "Combat Employment of the Air Forces"]

[Text] The victory in the Battle of Moscow was achieved in a struggle against a strong and experienced enemy. The Communist Party, the Supreme High Command and the command of the Soviet Air Forces, in considering the very difficult experience of the war's outbreak and the conclusions of Soviet military science, did everything necessary to dispel the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi Luftwaffe. The operational art of the Air Forces and the tactics of the branches of our aviation in the Battle of Moscow were enriched by the actual struggle for air supremacy, by experience in organizing and conducting effective air support for the ground troops and cooperation with them in defensive and offensive operations as well as improving the organizational structure of the Air Forces and control of aviation on all levels.

In the defensive employment at Moscow, the Soviet VVS [Air Forces] conducted combat operations in a difficult operational-strategic situation along a front over 700 km long. The offensive of the Nazi Army Group Center was supported by the second air fleet which in September 1941 had a fighting strength of 1,390 aircraft.¹ The VVS of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts defending the capital had around 520 combat aircraft. Upon a decision of Hq SHC, for reinforcing the VVS of the fronts, a portion of forces of the VI Air Defense Fighter Air Corps, formations of the long-range bomber aviation and the VVS of the Moscow Military District were used. But even in this instance quantitative superiority was on the side of enemy aviation.

For the purpose of coordinating the operations of the VVS of the fronts, the long-range bomber formations and the formations of the Moscow Defense Zone, under the command of the Red Army VVS, a special leadership body was organized (an operations group) which from 2 October 1941 effectively directed the air efforts in the defensive engagements. Thus, for eliminating the breakthrough of the Nazi 2d Tank Group in the zone of the Bryansk Front from the first days of October, Headquarters ordered the involvement of five divisions of the DBA [long-range bomber aviation] (commanders, Col V. Ye. Baturin, M. Kh. Borisenko, A. M. Duboshin and A. Ye. Golovanov and Lt Col Ye. F. Loginov), the VVS of the front (commander, Maj Gen Avn F. P. Polynin) and the just formed 6th Reserve Air Group (commander, Maj Gen Avn A. A. Semidov). The Soviet aviators operated actively and continuously attacking night and day the enemy tanks and motorized troops which had broken through and they reduced the momentum of its advance ensuring the gaining of time for the regrouping of the Hq SHC reserves and the occupying of new defensive lines. At the same time, for the purpose of ferrying troops and weapons of the I Guards Rifle Corps (commander, Maj Gen D. D. Lelyushenko) to the region of Mtsensk, the aviation of the IAF [Civil Air Fleet] and the DBA formations in 3 days delivered almost 5,500 men with their weapons and around 13 tons of ammunition.²

As the defensive engagement developed, the enemy lost its superiority in the number of aircraft. This was aided primarily by the measures undertaken by Hq SHC and the command of the Soviet Army VVS to strengthen the air groupings as well as the effective struggle for air supremacy. Two long-range bomber divisions were shifted from the Transcaucasian Front and newly organized air units arrived from the nation's rear. In October, on the basis of the VVS of the Moscow Military District an air group was organized under the command of Col N. A. Sbytov. It provided significant help to the troops of the 5th Army on the Mozhaysk Defensive Line. During this period nighttime air regiments were organized using PO-2, P-5 and P-2 aircraft.³

In the course of the defensive on the near approaches to Moscow, the aviation spent up to 50 percent of the sorties on destroying enemy troops on the battlefield and in the near operational depth. Here the Soviet VVS carried out up to 80 percent of all the sorties in the zone of the Western Front which was playing the main role in the defenses on the near approaches to Moscow.

The massed actions by our aviation in the defensive operations were a characteristic trait in the employment of the Soviet Army VVS in distinction to the initial period of the war. For attacking enemy troops, along with the front aviation, extensive use was also made of the DBA and air defense fighter aviation. From 15 November through 5 December alone, the VI Air Defense Fighter Corps mounted around 2,000 sorties for ground attack actions (up to 21 percent of all the sorties).

The representatives of Headquarters and the VVS command devoted great attention to strengthening centralization and to improving the means and methods of control. This provided an opportunity to maneuver the air forces on a broader scale over the theater, to bring its control directly to the battlefield, to achieve closer cooperation between the VVS and the ground troops, to correctly allocate forces for the entire period of the operation and to carefully study and generalize the experience of the best aviators.

In the course of the Battle of Moscow cooperation was improved between aviation and the ground troops. It became a rule for the commander of an air division or his deputy with an operations group to travel personally to the staff of a combined-arms field force and for liaison officers to visit the inferior staffs. The liaison officers were entrusted with the following missions: to report to the division commander on changes in the situation, to pass on requests, to observe the air actions of the sides, to help in identifying the types of aircraft and in camouflaging installations against enemy air strikes and to carry out other questions.

Checkpoints began to be organized. When necessary the aircraft were retargeted to other targets.

Hq SHC organized cooperation between the front aviation, the DBA and the IA PVO [air defense fighter aviation]. The front aviation operated in the zone of its front while the DBA and the IA PVO were used chiefly in the interests of the Western Front troops.

In the course of the defensive, Soviet aviation gained great experience in repelling massed raids by enemy aviation. This demonstrated the need for close cooperation between the front fighters and the air defense fighters as well as precise operation of the system of detecting aircraft in the air and notifying our fighters of this.

The basic document which planned air combat operations was the combat order or combat instruction for 24 hours, for a day or a sortie. When the front line had been stabilized, the Western Front VVS staff worked out the "Plan for the Combat Employment of the Western Front VVS from 11 November 1941 in the Defensive Operation."⁴ The combat operations of the aviation were planned considering the possible axes of the enemy's offensive. The aviation was given specific missions and was assigned the men and equipment for carrying out each of them. Moreover, the plan for the combat employment of the VVS dealt with the questions of aviation control and cooperation with the ground troops. The experience of such planning was further developed in the subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War.

From 30 September through 31 October 1941, the Western Front VVS alone destroyed 218 enemy aircraft including 120 shot down in air engagements.⁵

In October and November, Hq SHC organized and carried out two air operations in the aim of defeating the Nazi air grouping. The VVS of five fronts and the DBA formations were involved in the first lasting 8 days during the second 10 days of October. They, in operating along a broad front and to a great depth, made a series of massed and concentrated strikes against enemy airfields, destroying at least 500 aircraft.⁶ The VVS of four fronts and the DBA formations participated in the second air operation lasting 4 days during the first 10 days of November; these forces destroyed 111 aircraft at airfields and shot down 61 enemy aircraft in air engagements.⁷

Soviet aviation, along with the antiaircraft artillery, in defensive engagements destroyed 728 Nazi aircraft in the air and this significantly weakened the Nazi air grouping. The winning of operational supremacy in the air made it possible to concentrate the basic efforts of the VVS on air support for the defending troops. All of this helped to increase the strategic stability of the front.

Mar SU G. K. Zhukov who commanded the Western Front in the Battle of Moscow, has written: "Due to the common efforts of the front, long-range and air defense aviation, for the first time since the start of the Patriotic War, initiative in the air had been wrested from the enemy."⁸

The VVS in the defensive engagements at Moscow, having made a total of over 51,000 sorties, provided great help to the troops in holding the defensive positions and in making counterstrikes and counterattacks.

In the counteroffensive and in the period of the general offensive the basic missions of the VVS were: destroying enemy equipment and personnel in the tactical depth, maintaining air supremacy, dependably covering the advancing troops and preventing the bringing up of fresh enemy forces to the battlefield. The counteroffensive involved the VVS of the Kalinin, Western and a portion of the VVS forces of the Southwestern fronts, the aviation of the Moscow Defense Zone, the VI Air Defense Fighter Corps, two reserve air groups and the basic forces of the long-range bomber aviation. These numbered around 1,000 combat aircraft while the Nazis had over 600.⁹ The main role was assigned to the Western Front. Up to 80 percent of all the aviation concentrated in the area of Moscow was assigned for operations to its zone.

The Soviet Army VVS Command used a larger share of the aircraft for making concentrated strikes against enemy groupings to the north and northwest of Moscow and only 200 aircraft against the troops on the left flank.¹⁰ "The strength of the Russians' strike and the scope of this counteroffensive were such that they shook the front to a significant extent and almost led to an irrecoverable catastrophe," wrote the Nazi general, K. Tippelskirch.¹¹

The basic efforts of the aviation were concentrated on supporting the troops advancing along the main axes, and particularly against the northern enemy assault grouping and up to 70 percent of all the sorties were mounted here. Cooperation between the aviation and ground troops was organized on the level of the combined-arms army--air division (air group). For each day of the operation a combat planning table was worked out and this gave the objectives of the strikes, the order of targets and the time of the air operations. The targets were designated in the combat orders and instructions using large-scale maps.

For the operation a plan was elaborated for the airfield maneuvering of the aviation behind the advancing troops. Changes in the aviation rear bodies such as the creation of airfield servicing battalions (BAO) and the elimination of air base headquarters, increased its mobility and the effectiveness of its control.

In the counteroffensive at Moscow the VVS gained experience in air support for airborne operations. This was entrusted to the Western Front VVS and to a special detachment of the GVF. Careful analysis of this experience considering the shortcomings made in the first drops of large airborne forces (the great length of time in the drop, the poor organization of reconnaissance and landing and the insufficient consideration of weather conditions) made it possible for the Soviet Army VVS and VDV [Airborne Troops] Command to draw conclusions which determined the ways for improving the landing's operation.

The Soviet VVS played an important role in defeating the enemy assault groupings. The enemy suffered high losses in personnel and equipment. Over the period of the counteroffensive, our aviation mounted 10,150 sorties and as a total over the general offensive, more than 49,000. As a result of conducting the offensive operations, 1,136 enemy aircraft were destroyed in air engagements and on airfields, including 193 in the course of the counteroffensive. The myth of the invincibility of Nazi aviation was completely dispelled in the Battle of Moscow.

The centralized control of the VVS helped in their massed use. However, as was pointed out by the commander of the Red Army VVS in the Directive of 25 January 1942: "The use of the aviation of the fronts, considering its limited number, at present is being incorrectly carried out. The VVS commanders of the fronts, instead of the effective massed employment of aviation on the main sectors against the basic enemy objectives and groupings impeding the successful carrying out of the front's missions, have scattered the aviation means and efforts against numerous objectives on all sectors of the front.... The massing of air operations by the VVS commanders of the fronts in the interests of the planned operations has been carried out indecisively or has been totally lacking."¹³

In the offensive operations around Moscow, the VVS were restricted solely to the period of the air softening up for the attack. As soon as the troops went over to the offensive, the aviation shifted its efforts in depth. For this reason there was a gap in its operations with the troops in terms of time and place and this had a negative impact on the successful breaking through of enemy defenses. The questions of organizing and implementing continuous support for the ground troops from the air to the entire depth of the operation were developed in the subsequent offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, starting with the Stalingrad counteroffensive where the aviation was employed in the form of an air offensive.

In carrying out the mission of support for the advancing troops, the aviation was called in and guided to the targets by air representatives who were sent out to the staffs of the armies operating in the main sectors. The methods of aviation target designation and the designating of friendly troops were not sufficiently perfect. Because of this there were flaws in the organization and maintaining of cooperation between aviation and the ground troops (the aviation did not always make strikes against the most important objectives, it little coordinated its operations with the troops and sometimes wasted its efforts).

In the offensive operations at Moscow, Soviet aviation dependably maintained air superiority. The destruction of enemy aviation in the air was the basic method of combating hostile aviation (75.3 percent of the aircraft were shot down in air engagements).¹⁴ Prompt support for the maneuver of fighter aviation units was of important significance in the struggle to retain air supremacy. In the course of the offensive, fighter aviation fell behind and was forced to operate at maximum range and this limited its combat capabilities. Hq SHC in a directive of 22 January 1941 demanded: "...along with the advance of our units to immediately occupy airfields abandoned by the enemy as well as immediately rebase our fire aviation to these airfields with the assigning of two or three BAO."¹⁵

The experience of the VVS combat operations showed that the dividing of aviation into army and front and the presence of mixed air formations during that period

impeded the effective and massed use of it in the main sectors and for carrying out the most important missions. The creation of reserve air groups as temporary field forces did not fully resolve the problem of the massed use of aviation.

In the Battle of Moscow the forms and methods of the operational employment of the VVS underwent further development. The basic forms were joint operations with the field forces and formations of the other Armed Services and branches of troops, air operations to defeat the enemy air groupings, the combating of operational movements and reserves and VVS operations to support airborne operations.

The tactics of the branches of aviation was also developed. The fighter aviation carried out the missions of covering troops and installations, of supporting the combat operations of other branches of aviation, ground attack operations against enemy troops, the combating of Nazi scouts and the conducting of air reconnaissance. Patrolling was the basic method of combat operations in covering the troops and installations. With a lack of a sufficient amount of radio equipment, sorties were made from a status of "airfield duty" or "one in the sky."

In the Battle of Moscow new fighter battle formations were created based upon two-aircraft elements. These pairs were combined into groups of four, six and eight fighters. Gradually it became a practice to have open battle formations and stacking. Group air engagements began to be conducted more and more frequently using horizontal and vertical maneuvers.

Bomber aviation performed numerous various missions. The sparsity of front bomber and ground attack aviation required the use of long-range bombers in the enemy tactical defensive zone. The front bombers operated in groups of six-nine aircraft from level flight at altitudes of 1,000-2,500 m making a single run and in rare instances several. Concentrated strikes were also made. In the aim of achieving a continuous effect on the enemy in the offensive operations, the proportional amount of nighttime operations increased in comparison with the defensive period and was 10 percent of all the sorties.

On the basis of the combat experience of light motor aviation, in the Battle of Moscow a front nighttime bomber aviation was organized and the questions of its combat employment worked out. The positive experience of night bomber operations gained in the skies of Moscow was used over the entire war.

By the start of the counteroffensive, the ground attack aviation had increased somewhat and its basic efforts were focused on attacking the Nazi troops and objectives on the battlefield. The attack was made from low-level flight, from altitudes of 300-400 m, by individual combat aircraft, by flights and more rarely in groups of six-nine IL-2 aircraft. During this period for the first time the ground attack aviation began to employ a "circle" battle formation for attacking mobile targets and the method of a "combined" strike from altitudes of 800-1,000 m, when after strafing the targets with machine guns and cannons, bombs were dropped and then the same target was again covered with machine gun and cannon fire. In the offensive battles around Moscow, the role and significance of ground attack aviation became particularly apparent as the most effective means for close support of the ground troops.

As a result of the joint operations by the troops of the fronts and the aviation, the enemy assault groupings threatening Moscow were crushed. Here the enemy lost around 2,500 aircraft.

The successes of the Soviet fliers were the result of their high flying and military skill, their heroism and wholehearted dedication to the Communist Party and motherland. The party political work carried out in the air units and formations was a powerful means of ideological and political influence on the aviators and for indoctrinating them in a spirit of dedication to the party and people. This work was carried out widely and had a concrete, purposeful nature. Its content was determined by the party Central Committee Decrees. At the center of attention were the slogans: "We Will Defend Our Home Capital!" and "The Defeat of the Nazi Invaders Should Start at Moscow!"

During the period of the heroic battle around Moscow, the Soviet aviation guard was born. By special orders of the people's commissar of defense on 6 December 1941, 6 air regiments were transformed into guards units. For outstanding accomplishments in the struggle against the Nazi occupiers, as a total in the Battle of Moscow some 12 air regiments were changed into guards units (6 fighter, 5 bomber and 1 ground attack).

Thousands of aviators were awarded orders and medals and 52 courageous fliers were presented the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The experience of organizing and conducting VVS combat operations in the Battle of Moscow was of important significance for the further development of operational art and tactics for the branches of aviation. The VVS gained experience in participating in a strategic counteroffensive. It operated actively over the entire battle without pauses between its periods.

The experience of the engagements disclosed an urgent need to improve the organizational structure of the units and formations in the front and long-range bomber aviation, that is, to convert the VVS of the fronts into air armies and the DBA into long-range aviation and to organize uniform air corps as large highly maneuverable air reserves.

The carrying out of these important tasks commanded great effort by the Party Central Committee and the Soviet government, the General Staff, the command, the military council and staff of the VVS. A majority of the questions had already been worked out at the start of 1942, they were reported to Hq SHC and actually began to be carried out.

The experience of the combat employment of the VVS in the Battle of Moscow can be creatively employed at present. Now the VVS, due to the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for strengthening the nation's defense capability, are outfitted with qualitatively new equipment. The combat aircraft and helicopters in service in the VVS possess high flight and tactical performance, modern equipment and powerful missile and cannon weapons.

The Soviet aviators, in carrying out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and in relying on the experience acquired during the years of the last war, are steadily

mastering the new generation of airplanes and helicopters, they are improving their military skills, they are increasing vigilance and combat readiness in every possible way and vigilantly guarding the air frontiers of our motherland.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ SVE [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 1, Voenizdat, 1976, p 494.
 - ² "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Concise History], Voenizdat, 1970, p 116.
 - ³ M. N. Kozhevnikov, "Komandovaniye i shtab VVS Sovetskoy Armii v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army VVS in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1977, p 62.
 - ⁴ TsAMO SSSR, folio 208, inv. 2683, file 15, sheets 3-5.
 - ⁵ "Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945." [The Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voenizdat, 1968, pp 71-72.
 - ⁶ TsAMO SSSR, folio 35, inv. 30802, file 8, sheets 1, 2.
 - ⁷ Ibid., inv. 11285, file 74, sheets 85-86; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1972, p 21.
 - ⁸ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1966, p 74.
 - ⁹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 4, pp 283, 284.
 - ¹⁰ TsAMO SSSR, folio 208, inv. 142690, file 3, sheet 39; file 2, sheets 19-22.
 - ¹¹ K. Tippelskirch, "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War II], Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1956, p 201.
 - ¹² [not in text]
 - ¹³ TsAMO SSSR, folio 217, inv. 441526, file 3, sheets 13-17.
 - ¹⁴ "Bitva pod Moskvoy. Boyevoye primeneniye VVS" [The Battle of Moscow. Combat Employment of the VVS], p 36.
 - ¹⁵ TsAMO SSSR, folio 346, inv. 52133, file 3, sheets 89, 90.
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Employment of Air Defense Forces

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 46-52

[Article by Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Mar Avn A. Koldunov, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Troops and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense: "Combat Employment of Air Defense Forces"]

[Text] The Nazi Command on the Moscow axis had concentrated the strong Center army assault grouping which had the ultimate mission of capturing Moscow. The 2d Air Fleet had been assigned for its air support.¹

According to the plans of the Nazi Command, one of the missions of the 2d Air Fleet was to carry out an air offensive against Moscow in the aim of destroying it. By powerful bombing strikes on our state's capital, the Nazis planned to paralyze its life, cause serious damage to the Soviet economy, undermine the morale of the Soviet people and thereby achieve the rapid capture of Moscow and a victorious conclusion to the "blitzkrieg" against the USSR.

The Air Defense Troops made a significant contribution to the victory of our troops at Moscow as they successfully defended our motherland's capital against air attack.

From the very first days of the treacherous attack on the USSR, Hitler demanded the quickest possible start of air bombing of Moscow. On 8 July 1941, at a meeting at Headquarters Hitler stated that he intended to wipe Moscow from the face of the earth.² For carrying out the air offensive against the Soviet capital, the command of the German Luftwaffe set up a special grouping consisting of the best bomber squadrons from the First, Second and Fourth Air fleets. Leadership of the air operations was entrusted to the command of the Second Air Fleet which was operating on the Moscow strategic sector.

The Communist Party Central Committee and the Soviet government devoted constant attention to the questions of air defense for the nation as a whole and primarily the capital of our motherland. A powerful air defense was organized for Moscow and this far surpassed in terms of strength and organization the defense of the capitals of the other belligerent capitalist states.

Even during the first month of the Great Patriotic War the party Central Committee and the Soviet government had adopted additional measures to strengthen the Moscow air defenses. According to a decree of the State Defense Committee [GKO] of 9 July 1941 "on the air defenses of Moscow," in July the number of fighter regiments was more than tripled, several additional antiaircraft artillery regiments were organized and the network of barrage balloon posts was almost trebled.³ Fighter aviation received new, rather advanced high-speed fighters for those times such as the MIG-3, the LAGG-3 and YAK-1, while the antiaircraft artillery units were equipped with semiautomatic 85-mm cannons with the PUAZO-3 [AAFCE].

In July 1941, a command-staff exercise was conducted with the leadership of the Moscow Air Defense Zone. It was of great importance for testing the readiness of the air defense system to repel the air raids.

The Moscow Air Defense Zone (commander, Maj Gen M. S. Gromadin), in encompassing the entire Moscow Economic Region, included the I Air Defense Corps (commander, Maj Gen Art D. A. Zhuravlev) and the VI Fighter Air Corps (commander, Col I. D. Klimov and from November 1941, Col A. I. Mitenkov) which directly covered Moscow as well as the Kalinin and Tula Brigade Air Defense regions. In November 1941, the Moscow Air Defense Zone was turned into the Moscow Corps Region, and in April 1942, the Moscow Air Defense Front was created.

When the enemy started massed air raids on Moscow, the troops directly covering our motherland's capital had 602 fighter aircraft, 1,044 antiaircraft guns of medium and small caliber, 336 antiaircraft machine guns, 618 searchlight stations, 124 barrage balloon posts, 8 radars and 612 VNOS [aircraft warning service] posts.⁴

The Moscow air defenses were a classic example of defending a major center and industrial area of our nation against air attack. This was based upon a decision to create an all-round, deeply echeloned defense with the reinforcing of it on the most dangerous sectors (northwestern, western and southwestern) with close cooperation of the fighter aviation, antiaircraft artillery, antiaircraft searchlights and barrage balloons. The total depth of the Moscow Air Defense Zone reached 250 km and this made it possible to detect and meet the air enemy with fighter forces at the distant approaches to the capital and to subsequently increase the efforts to defeat it. The fighter air regiments were located at airfields around the capital in a radius of up to 100-120 km. After the first major raids, in the aim of broadening the zone of fighter operations, a portion of the regiments was shifted to airfields located up to 200 km to the west of Moscow.

The direct approaches to the capital at a depth of up to 32 km from its center were covered by medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery. A larger portion of the small-caliber antiaircraft artillery and the antiaircraft machine guns (up to 60-70 percent) were used to reinforce the air defenses of the Kremlin, stations, power plants and other objectives inside the city. Up to 30-40 percent of these weapons were assigned to cover the fighter airfields, the battle formations of the medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery and the antiaircraft searchlights, the locks on the Moscow-Volga Canal and other important installations outside the city limits.

In the aim of strengthening the defenses of the city center, a barrage balloon zone was created in a radius of 5-6 km from the Kremlin while along the western and southern outskirts of the city there was a barrage balloon zone some 2-4 km deep. The VNOS units around Moscow formed two circular warning zones and a solid observation field. The first zone ran 200-250 km from the capital and the second 50-60 km behind the first. The line of the solid observation field was 100-125 km from the center of the capital. In the Rzhev-Vyaz'ma area a radar detection zone was organized.

For supporting nighttime fighter operations on the approaches to Moscow by the start of the massed enemy air raids, six searchlight fields (SPP) were created each of 35 km in size, the first line of which was 70 km from the city center. By November 1941, a solid ring of SPP had already been created around the city.

Control over the combat operations of all the air defense troops defending the capital was basically carried out on a centralized basis by the commander of the I Air

Defense Corps at the command post of whom was also the command post of the VI Fighter Air Corps. Decentralized control over the combat of the air defense units and subunits occurred only in defending individual objectives outside the city limits (airfields, pumping stations and so forth) and with the surprise appearance of an air enemy. A plan for the cooperation of the resources in the Moscow Air Defense Zone was worked out jointly by the staffs of the fighter aviation and anti-aircraft artillery ahead of time and was subsequently issued to all cooperating units. Telephone wire communications was the basic type of communications in the control system of the Moscow Air Defense Troops. Radio communications was widely used in the fighter aviation and the VNOS service and to a smaller degree in the anti-aircraft artillery. The main mission of the air defense troops with the start of the Nazi air offensive against the capital and over the entire Battle of Moscow was to prevent the enemy air operations and ensure a normal life and activity in the city. Along with this the Moscow air defense troops provided an air cover for the troop groupings of the fronts and their lines of communications, reconnaissance of the ground enemy and the direct combating of enemy ground troops and primarily the tank groupings. They participated in the struggle for winning air supremacy and in the air support for the counteroffensive by the Soviet troops at Moscow in the winter of 1941-1942.

The enemy air offensive which was preceded by a 3-week air reconnaissance of the Moscow air defense system started on 22 July and lasted 4.5 months, up to 5 December 1941.

The Moscow air defense troops had to fight the enemy aviation under unfavorable conditions, when it possessed numerical superiority over the Soviet Army VVS. This made it possible for the Nazi Command to concentrate a rather strong grouping for attacking Moscow and to carry out systematic mass raids. The first of them involving 250 bombers was successfully driven off. In October-November 1941, the raids were significantly intensified.

The conditions for the combat operations of the air defense units became abruptly more difficult with the approach of the front line to Moscow. The enemy, having shifted a portion of the forces to forward airfields, began to use fighter aviation to escort the bombers and to make several raids a day. Along with nighttime raids, the Nazis also commenced daytime ones. Moreover, special groups of airplanes were assigned to neutralize the air defense forces and seal off the airfields of our fighter aviation. At the same time the depth of the VNOS system was reduced in the capital's air defenses, a portion of the airfields had to be abandoned and individual fighter regiments shifted to the east of Moscow, and certain SPP to the west of Moscow eliminated. In September 8 RUS-2 radars were deployed around the capital. The use of more advanced radars with greater detection range than the RUS-1 under these conditions was of important significance for providing the Moscow Air Defense Command with information on the air situation at the distant approaches. This helped in promptly taking a decision for the combat employment of the air defense troops and primarily for moving the fighter air forces to create superiority in the main sector of enemy air operations.

The air defense troops with the start of the Nazi air offensive and during the defensive period during the Battle of Moscow successfully carried out the main task of ensuring normal activities in the frontline city. Over the entire period of this

offensive (July-December 1941), the Nazi aviation undertook 122 raids involving 1,146 aircraft (only 229 broke through to the city, that is, a little more than 3 percent).⁵ At the same time the Moscow air defense units destroyed 952 enemy aircraft and hit over 130.⁶ The plan for destroying our capital from the air as worked out by the Nazi Command was thwarted just as successfully as the plan to capture Moscow by the enemy ground troops.

During the period of the defensive operations in the Battle of Moscow, along with repelling enemy air raids against our motherland's capital and providing an air cover for the defending formations and units of the fronts as well as the installations of the front and army rear services, a portion of the air defense forces was involved in fighting enemy infantry and tanks. Thus, from 2 through 10 October, four regiments from the VI Fighter Air Corps made strafing attacks against the enemy motorized units which had broken through in the area of Belyy, checking their advance toward Rzhev. In the second half of November, this air corps also participated in destroying the enemy grouping in the area of Klin, Turginovo.

In carrying out the orders of Hq SHC of 12 October 1941, all antiaircraft batteries located to the west, southwest and south of Moscow were given the tasks not only of repelling the air enemy but also destroying enemy tank units and personnel which had broken through.⁷ Simultaneously 211 guns were assigned from the antiaircraft artillery of the I Air Defense Corps for the needs of Moscow antitank defenses.⁸ The antiaircraft gunners of the Tula Brigade Air Defense Region were the first to engage the enemy tanks. During the night of 29 October 1941, the enemy, having encountered stubborn resistance from the 732d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment under the command of Maj M. T. Bondarenko and having lost several tanks, was forced to halt. On 30 October, the Nazis attacked four times in trying to take the town, but each time they were forced to retreat. Here the enemy suffered high losses in men and equipment. During the day of the memorable battle, the antiaircraft gunners destroyed 26 enemy tanks and much personnel. The men from the gun platoon of the 6th Antiaircraft Battery of Lt G. M. Volnyanskiy covered themselves in immortal glory during this battle. During the period of the November Nazi Offensive against Moscow, upon instructions of Hq SHC, the I Air Defense Corps created two special antiaircraft artillery groups designed to eliminate enemy tank groupings that had broken through. As a result of the able and heroic actions of these groups, dangerous breakthroughs by tank groupings were eliminated in the regions of Klin, Belyy Rast, between the Moscow--Volga Canal and the Klyaz'minskoye Reservoir.

With the going over of our troops to the counteroffensive at Moscow on 5-6 December 1941 and with the development of the general offensive by the Soviet Army on the western sector, the activities of enemy aviation against Moscow declined sharply since its basic forces were countering our advancing troops. This was caused by the fact also that by this time the Soviet VVS for the first time had won operational air supremacy over Moscow⁹ and this was significantly aided by the active operations of the air defense troops.

Under these conditions, the fighter air regiments of the VI Air Defense fighter corps were widely used to support the troop offensive of the Western Front. They actually carried out the missions of front aviation, that is, they conducted reconnaissance in the interests of the ground troops, they escorted bombers and ground attack planes, they covered the troops on the battlefield and made strafing attacks against enemy troops and airfields.

In repelling the raids of enemy aviation, our fighter pilots also carried out mid-air ramming. The intrepid air fighter V. Talalikhin during the night of 7 August 1941 made an air ramming without illumination of the target by searchlights. Two days later, the pilot, Communist A. Katrich won glory for himself by a high-altitude ramming (at an altitude of 8,000 m). The name of the courageous pilot, Hero of the Soviet Union B. Kovzan, has become a symbol of glory and heroism. Maintaining control in the most difficult situation, four times he employed a ramming and each time the iron will, skill and bravery of the Soviet flier brought him victory.

The antiaircraft gunners also successfully routed the enemy. In the battles to defend Moscow, the men of the Red Army's oldest 193d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (commander, Lt Col M. G. Kiknadze) distinguished themselves. This unit was covering the most crucial western sector. During July-December 1941, the regiment almost daily fought the Nazi aviation. During this time its batteries shot down 38 enemy aircraft. By an order of the people's commissar of defense of 7 November 1942, the regiment was turned into a guards unit.

The Battle of Moscow ended with a glorious victory of the Soviet Army over the Nazi invaders. In fighting in single formation with its defenders, the men of the Moscow air defenses successfully carried out the set mission. As a total over the period of the war, the air defense troops defending Moscow and the objectives on the approaches to the city destroyed 1,305 aircraft, 450 tanks, around 5,000 motor vehicles, up to 50,000 enemy infantry as well as much diverse equipment and transport.¹⁰ The motherland had high praise for the contribution of the Air Defense Troops to the achieving of victory at Moscow. For combat feats over 25,000 men received orders and medals of the USSR and 32 soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.¹¹ Many formations and units were turned into guards ones.

The main result from the combat activities of the Moscow air defense troops was that they, in cooperation with the VVS and the organic air defenses of the fronts, checked the enemy's air offensive against our capital, they protected it against destruction from the air and ensured normal life and activity. The air defenses of the Soviet capital were insurmountable for the Nazi aviation. Moscow was the only capital which during World War II did not suffer substantial damage from enemy air raids and this was the most important and most convincing indicator of the effectiveness of its air defenses.

The experience of Moscow air defenses confirmed the correctness of the underlying principles for organizing the air defenses of large centers and industrial areas of the nation as elaborated in the prewar period and undergoing further development in the course of combat operations. Proving fully effective were such major principles as ensuring constant combat readiness of the troops, creating an all-round deeply echeloned installation-local defense and the massing of men and equipment to protect important centers and strategic areas with close cooperation among all the branches of air defense troops.

The successful employment of the major air defense resources in the defense of Moscow was ensured by the unifying of them under a single command and by their centralized control. Practice has convincingly shown that only unified command of all the air defense forces and primarily the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery (and now the antiaircraft missile troops) ensures their coordinated actions. And this is an important condition in the effective employment of the air defense troops in combating an air enemy.

The combat operations of the air defense troops in the Battle of Moscow aimed at repelling the air enemy and checking its air operations developed into a series of coordinated engagements and battles which were unified by a unified plan. In terms of their content, the achieved results and the number of involved troops, they in essence marked a beginning to the rise of a new form of their operational employment, the air defense operation. The obtained combat experience in the air defense of Moscow was an important contribution to developing the tactics and operational art of the Air Defense Troops and their successful operations in countering the Nazi Luftwaffe. In the course of the following combat actions, the trends in the operational employment of the Air Defense Troops became more clearly apparent. These were: the massing of men and equipment to carry out the main missions; the early planning of the combat employment of the air defense field forces following a single plan with the giving of operational-strategic missions to them; the active nature of the combat operations to defeat the air enemy; the great spatial scope, great intensity and speed of the engagements and battles against the air enemy; the broad operational maneuver of the men and equipment within and between the field forces in the aim of concentrating efforts on the crucial sectors; the changeover to the broad, maneuvering use of air defense fighter aviation to cover areas, objectives and troops; the organization and implementation of operational cooperation between the field forces as well as with the combined-arms field forces on the questions of air defense in the front zone; the broad use of operations groups of field force and formation staffs for centralized control over the air defense groupings from the various armed forces in their joint execution of a combat mission in one area.

In the tactics of the branches of the Air Defense Troops the specific procedures and methods of conducting combat inherent to one or another branch of troops were improved, considering the properties and capabilities of its weapons. Here particular attention was given to the methods of actions for the given branch of troops in combined-arms combat in cooperation with the other branches.

Moreover, the general tactics of Air Defense Troops arose and underwent development. This elaborated the questions of the integrated use of the various air defense resources in the aim of creating a dependable system for covering installations.

The lessons stemming from the experience of Moscow's air defenses have not lost their importance now. Their creative application under present-day conditions, when there have been fundamental changes in both the means of air attack and the means of defense, has had a positive influence on the development of the theory and practice of the operational employment of the Air Defense Troops. These lessons help in quickly finding dependable solutions to the present problems of air defense for the nation's installations and troop groupings, to more profoundly understand the developmental processes of military affairs and avoid mistakes already encountered in the past.

The on-going improvement in the air attack weapons of the probable enemy, the decision of the Reagan Administration to produce neutron weapons and the planned deployment of new medium-range American nuclear missiles and cruise missiles in direct proximity to the frontiers of the USSR and the nations of the socialist commonwealth make the threat of a surprise attack by the imperialist aggressors even more acute. This demands from us, the men of the Air Defense Troops, the highest vigilance and a continuous rise in combat readiness.

Proceeding from the existing international situation, the Communist Party not for a single day overlooks the questions of strengthening the nation's defense might and that of its Armed Forces including the Air Defense Troops. Due to this their combat capabilities are continuously rising.

Today's Air Defense Troops are qualitatively new troops. They are equipped with powerful and effective military equipment and weapons embodying the latest achievements of modern scientific and technical progress.

The men of the Air Defense Troops are fully determined by their military service to make a worthy contribution to carrying out the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 4, p 24.
- ² SVE, Vol 6, Voenizdat, 1978, p 584.
- ³ Ibid., p 583.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 4, p 108.
- ⁶ TsAMO SSSR, folio 6314, inv. 717170, file 4, sheets 278-289.
- ⁷ Ibid., folio 72, inv. 12277, file 1, sheet 15.
- ⁸ Ibid., folio 741, inv. 7086/3, file 1, sheet 92.
- ⁹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 4, p 109.
- ¹⁰ "Voyiska protivovozdushnoy oborony strany. Istoricheskiy ocherk" [The National Air Defense Troops. Historical Essay], Voenizdat, 1968, p 125.
- ¹¹ SVE, Vol 6, p 584.

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Participation of Naval Personnel

From VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 53-59

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Adm (Ret) S. Zakharov: "Combat Operations of Naval Personnel"]

[Text] Sailors also fought heroically alongside the men of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Moscow. In the most intense period the Western Front received six

separate naval rifle brigades (omsbr) and the 1st Moscow Sailor Detachment which subsequently was changed to the 154th Naval Rifle Brigade. The 62d, 71st and 84th brigades were part of the 1st Assault Army, the 64th was in the 20th Army while the 74th and 75th brigades were in the Moscow Defense Zone. The naval rifle brigades participated in the liberation of many towns and villages in Moscow Oblast from the Nazi invaders. Also participating in the battles for Moscow was the 14th Separate Rocket Battalion (rocket artillery) under the command of Capt-It A. P. Moskvina.

As a member of the military council of the Pacific Fleet during the years of the Great Patriotic War, I was well acquainted with the names of many Pacific Fleet sailors who I happened to lead to the front and I know their heroic feats (certain of the sailors are shown in photographs published in this issue [not reproduced]). Memories of them surged back with new strength after studying the archival materials and visiting the sights of the former battles in the Greater Moscow Area where I recently happened to visit with a group of war veterans.

Basically the 64th omsbr (commander, Col I. M. Chistyakov and military commissar, Reg. Com. V. I. Tulimov) was organized from sailors of the Pacific Fleet and officer candidates of the naval schools. This brigade arrived at the front on 25 November 1941. Entrenching in the area of Zagorsk, the brigade initially conducted defensive battles as part of the troops of the 20th Army on the line of the settlements of Chernaya, Sukharevo and Khlebnikovo, some 20 km long. Its right flank was located in the immediate proximity of the Moscow--Volga Canal.¹ In stubborn battles the sailors repelled several enemy attacks and held the positions. From 3 through 4 December, together with the 24th Tank Brigade, the naval infantrymen conducted fierce battles for the village of Belyy Rast located 35 km to the north of Moscow, on a hill and at the fork of the Rogachev and Dmitrov highway. The Nazis, in utilizing the advantageous terrain conditions (the village was on an elevation), created a strongpoint here. In it they concentrated significant forces of infantry, tanks, artillery and mortars.

During these engagements the sailors and tank troops demonstrated high military skill and showed mass heroism. During the night of 6 December, the village of Belyy Rast was attacked by tank-mounted infantry consisting of a group of submachine gunners headed by Btl. Com. G. O. Likhomanov. The naval infantrymen on 10 tanks, having neutralized the enemy battle outposts, broke into the village and destroyed more than 70 Nazis. However the forces were far from equal and the planned offensive on Belyy Rast by other subunits developed slowly. For this reason the sailors were forced to retreat but they constantly counterattacked the enemy, wearing it down, and 7 days later in cooperation with the tank troops took the point fortified by the Nazis by storm. In the battles for this village many of them died the death of the brave. Among the fallen were the chief of the brigade political section, Reg. Com. G. M. Smirnov, Btl. Com. G. O. Likhomanov and others.²

With the liberation of the village of Belyy Rast, the offensive continued. In pursuing the enemy retreating toward Volokolamsk, the brigade in 13 days fought its way 130 km, liberating 30 population points and capturing 12 tanks, 43 guns, 141 motor vehicles and much other military equipment.

On 20 December, the troops of the 20th Army, with the participation of sailors from the 64th Brigade, liberated Volokolamsk, a major center of resistance in the enemy

defenses on the Lama River line. Particularly stubborn battles ensued for the village of Ivanovskaya which changed hands twice. The Nazis were endeavoring to hold this population point at any price, as in the event of losing it the units of our 64th Brigade would reach the rear of their Volokolamsk grouping. Here a heroic feat was committed by the naval artillerymen from the gun crew of Sgt A. A. Lobchenko. When the sailors had retaken the village, the enemy attacked them with tanks. The men of the crew brought up the weapon and with direct laying began to fire at the advance group consisting of four enemy tanks. Allowing the tanks to approach to a close distance, they hit two of them. But the gunner and ammunition handler were killed. Lobchenko, wounded by shrapnel, along with the loader G. I. Davletshin, continued the battle. They hit one other tank. Soon the loader fell and the sergeant was alone at the gun. He himself loaded, aimed the gun and hit the fourth tank. The Nazi attack was checked but Lobchenko also perished.

In continuing the offensive along with other army units, the brigade was the first to cross the enemy defenses on the Lama River and in fierce battles captured the points of Vladychino and Timkovo. In the heavy battles for Timkovo, in repelling an enemy counterattack, the military commissar of the brigade, Reg. Com. Vasilii Ivanovich Tulinov, died heroically. One of the founders of the brigade was no longer and he from the very first days of battle had always been among the personnel, sharing all the hardships of combat life with them. With his ardent word he was able to inspire the sailors to a feat. On 25 December the brigade took up the defensive to the northwest of Gzhatsk. Over the period of the offensive, its fighters had destroyed more than 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers and captured much equipment.

For the exemplary carrying out of combat missions in the battles around Moscow, the 64th Brigade received the Order of the Red Banner while its men were presented orders and medals for courage and valor. The brigade commander, Col I. M. Chistyakov, received the Order of the Red Banner.⁴

The men of the 62d omsbr (commander, Col V. M. Rogov and military commissar, Btl. Com. D. I. Besser) also fought the enemy courageously. This unit was basically manned by Pacific Fleet sailors. V. M. Rogov, prior to his departure to the front, had served on the fleet staff while D. I. Besser was the formation's military commissar. I recall how constantly they requested to be sent to the front. Since the command of the naval brigades then being organized was chosen from the best prepared commanders and political workers, their request was granted.

During the first days of December 1941, the brigade arrived in Zagorsk and on 12 December became part of the 1st Assault Army. Having crossed the Moscow--Volga Canal, it came into contact with the enemy in the area to the west of the town of Klin. In the following battles, the personnel of the 64th omsbr cleared the Nazi invaders out of the rayon center of Lotoshino, the population points of Kruglovo, Shapkovo, Karlovo and many others.⁵ The Pacific Fleet sailors demonstrated courage and heroism. We will give just two examples.

In the battles for the population point of Kruglovo, the company commander was severely wounded. He was replaced by the political leader of the first battalion Nikolay Fedorovich Kashnikov, a former Pacific Fleet sailor and secretary of a ship Komsomol organization. I recall that while in the fleet, Kashnikov wrote several

reports requesting to enlist in a naval infantry unit which was to be sent to the front. Finally his request was granted. In the very first battles the sailor distinguished himself and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for heroism, bravery and courage. He wrote to the fleet: "Dear Pacific Fleet Friends, I am justifying the honorable title of a man of the Red Army. If death blocks the way, I will accept it. What is death in comparison with what we are fighting for! I accept it without fear, but first will do away with a score fascists. They are retreating but are resisting desperately. We are driving them and will drive them to a victorious end."⁶ In the battle for Kruglovo, Kashnikov also fought heroically. Heading the company, he led it skillfully. The enemy was driven out of the village. But then the political leader was mortally wounded and died in the arms of the soldiers.⁷

In the battle for the population point of Maleyevo, the Komsomol member Nikolay Kudryashov committed a heroic feat. The company of submachine gunners in which he served had broken into the village and engaged the enemy. Inhabitants informed Kudryashov that the Nazis were removing documents from the staff headquarters. The naval infantrymen rushed there, killed the sentry and threw grenades into the house. Here he was severely wounded and captured by the enemy. They subjected the sailor to terrible torture in trying to learn the position of the brigade's units, its strength and weapons. Being unable to break the will of the hero, they executed him and pushed him under the ice. During the night the local inhabitants in risking their lives recovered the body of N. F. Kudryashov and buried it.⁸

The 62d omsbr fought its way 150 km, it liberated around 40 population points and defeated 3 enemy regiments. Its combat operations were highly regarded. In a radio-gram from the commander of the 1st Assault Army, Lt Gen V. I. Kuznetsov, addressed to the brigade commander, Col V. M. Rogov, it was noted: "The supreme high command, having heard the report of the army military council on the army's combat operations, has requested that we forward to you congratulations for the good combat operations of the brigade."⁹ The Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, M. I. Kalinin, at a meeting with the sailors near Klin where they were temporarily stationed said: "The sailors fought well at Moscow. I hope that you will also not hesitate on the other fronts...."¹⁰

Let us briefly take up the combat operations of the 71st omsbr (commander, Col Yu. P. Mezverkhov and military commissar, Reg. Com. Ye. V. Bobrov). It was also basically manned with Pacific Fleet sailors. On 27 November 1941, it arrived at an important sector of the front in the area of Yakhroma, where the Nazi troops were approaching the Moscow--Volga Canal. The brigade participated in a counterstrike in this area and then in the general offensive of the Soviet troops. As a result of the fierce battles from 4 through 6 December 1941, the naval infantrymen occupied the population points of Yazykovo, Goncharovo, Borisovo and Sokol'niki which had been heavily fortified by the enemy.

The brigade fought stubbornly to take the village of Yazykovo in Dmitrovskiy Rayon and the battles reached the point of hand-to-hand combat. Regardless of the fact that the enemy had created a strong system of multilayered firing to cover the approaches to the village from any direction, on 6 December by a decisive nighttime attack the sailors finally took this important enemy strongpoint. In this battle the Nazis lost 600 soldiers and officers in killed alone, as well as 8 tanks, 7 armored vehicles and much other military equipment.¹¹

Lt G. I. Stulov distinguished himself in the battle for Yazykovo. Along with the artillerymen, Sr Sn Borisov and Khudyakov, he unnoticed crawled up to an enemy gun which had been set up between houses and was firing along the street impeding the advance of the attackers. The bold men overcame the Nazi crew with grenades and using the captured gun opened fire against a gun turret with Nazi machine gunners inside. It took the courageous sailors several rounds to silence the enemy machine gun nest. Many such examples of heroism could be given.

From 7 through 10 December, in continuing the offensive and pursuing the broken up Nazi units, the men of the brigade occupied the villages of Andreykino, Khrabrovo, Vol'yevo and Timonovo. In the battles for these population points the sailors destroyed around a regiment of enemy troops and captured much equipment.

Not far from Solnechnogorsk is the village of Timonovo. In 1941, it was an important Nazi strongpoint on the approaches to the town. In the battle for Timonovo, the Pacific Fleet sailor, Capt Arkadiy Nikolayevich Golyako, died the death of a hero. At the head of a battalion he broke into the village. However, a group of enemy submachine gunners located in the cellar of a building blocked the advance of the head company in the battalion with their fire. Then Capt Golyako threw several grenades in the cellar's window and destroyed the Nazis located there. But an enemy bullet caught him.

"Advance, the village must be ours!" were the last words of the hero sailor.

The men of the battalion took these words as a battle order. They occupied the village. The enemy retreated to the west with heavy losses.¹²

From 10 through 15 December 1941, in continuing to fight its way forward toward Volokolamsk, the brigade liberated the population points of Subbotino, Kozino, Golovkovo, Martynovo and Shapkino. Then it took another 25 population points from the enemy and destroyed over two regiments and captured much equipment. From 15 through 24 December, the units of the brigade occupied the population points of Filatovo, Baturovo, Vorotov, Kondratovo, Il'inskoye and Kuzyayevo and, coming out on the line of the Lama River, dug in firmly on the approaches to the strongly fortified Nazi lines. On 27 December 1941, by an order of the people's commissar of defense, the 71st Brigade was the first of the naval rifle formations to be turned into the 2d Guards Rifle Brigade for the exemplary execution of combat missions.

On 11-12 January 1942, the 2d Guards Rifle Brigade, in carrying out an order of the commander of the 1st Assault Army, went over to a decisive offensive, it crushed the enemy defenses, crossed the Lama River and liberated Sinel'nikovo and Spas-Pomazkino. From 13 through 20 January, by fighting it captured the population points of Novinki, L'vovo, Belaya Kopan', Berkunovo, Yelizavetino, Novo-Nikol'skoye, Robli, Bobniye and reached Shakhovskaya Station.¹³ In operating as part of the 1st Assault Army, the brigade in continuous battles fought 150 km and cleared 75 population points of the enemy.¹⁴

Let us also tell about the 84th omsbr (commander, Col V. A. Molev and military commissar, Reg. Com. S. A. Andreyev) which was basically manned by sailors from the Pacific Fleet, the Amur Flotilla and officer candidates from the naval schools. On 25-27 November, the brigade unloaded in the town of Ryazhsk in Ryazanskaya Oblast and commenced combat operations. During 26-28 November, the sailors participated

in the liberation of the town of Skopin where the enemy 5th Motorcycle Regiment was defeated. On 1 December the brigade was shifted to Zagorsk where it became part of the 1st Assault Army. The sailors fought their way more than 180 km to the west. During this time they liberated 35 population points from the Nazi invaders, they destroyed over 4,000 soldiers and officers and captured much equipment.¹⁵

The naval infantrymen conducted fierce battles to capture the key enemy positions on the near approaches to Klin. On 15 December, in the battles for the village of Borisoglebskoye, an enemy bullet cut down the courageous brigade commander Vasily Andreyevich Molev. The brigade was taken over by Maj Gen M. Ye. Kozyr'. On 15 December, the men of the 84th Brigade, together with units from the 1st Assault Army, just behind the retreating enemy broke into the town of Klin and after heavy street battles completed its full liberation.

The 84th omsbr had a glorious campaign record. The combat log of the 1st Assault Army states: "Up to 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed in the region liberated by the sailors of the 84th omsbr in the villages of Pavel'tsevo and Petrakovskoye. The brigade captured 250 motor vehicles, 30 tanks, 21 guns, 150 motorcycles, 50 machine guns, more than 100 km of telephone cable and much equipment. In pursuing the enemy, it cleared the enemy out of the population point of Shiryayeva Sloboda and was the first to reach the Lama River. Here the artillery battalion of 76-mm guns under Maj S. I. Perepelitsa particularly distinguished itself in destroying eight enemy batteries. For able actions in the most heavily fortified sector of enemy defenses, the brigade commander, Maj Gen M. Ye. Kozyr', who replaced the fallen Col Molev, and the brigade's military commissar, Reg. Com. V. S. Andreyev, were commended by the commander G. K. Zhukov. More than 150 of the most distinguished naval infantrymen received governmental combat decorations."¹⁶

Soon thereafter the 84th omsbr was shifted to the Northwestern Front where it took an active part in the battles to encircle the 16th German Army.

It remains to tell of the combat operations of the 75th omsbr (commander, Capt 1st Rank K. D. Sukhiashvili and military commissar, Div. Com. A. A. Murav'yev). It was formed of sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla and officer candidates from the naval schools. Arriving in Lyublino on 18 December 1941, the brigade came under the command of the Moscow Defense Zone as a Headquarters reserve. In the middle of January 1942, the brigade's units, together with troops from the 1st Assault Army, broke through the enemy defenses on the Lama River line and reached Shakhovskaya Station. In fighting as part of the II Guards Rifle Corps, the brigade liberated scores of population points from the Nazi occupiers including the strong-points of Knyazevo, Filashkino, Kozlovo, Davydovo, Sychevo, Mikhalkino and others. Soon thereafter the brigade was transferred to the Northwestern Front where, in fighting as part of the same corps, it distinguished itself and in March 1942, was transformed into the 3d Guards Rifle Brigade.

The commander of the II Guards Rifle Corps, Maj Gen A. I. Lizyukov, had high praise for the activities of the sailor. He wrote: "The guards unit of Sukhiashvili demonstrated such tenacity and stubbornness before which the glory of many famous feats of the guards of previous times pales."¹⁷ In fighting for Moscow, the sailors provided substantial aid to the troops of the Western Front both in the period of the stubborn defensive and in the course of the decisive offensive. They liberated 250 population points in Moscow Oblast and took a most active part in defeating the most dangerous enemy groupings which were breaking through toward Moscow.

In the Battle of Moscow, the sailors demonstrated high moral-combat qualities. They were steadfast on the defensive and intrepid and daring on the offensive. Their wholehearted bravery, boldness and disdain for death spread terror in the Nazis and evoked amazement in their brothers in arms.

Mar SU G. K. Zhukov in his memoirs has written that the naval rifle brigades at Moscow covered themselves in combat glory and significantly contributed to the overall success of the Soviet troops.¹⁸

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 1, file 8839, sheet 14.
- ² Along with visiting other battle sites near Moscow, our group of war veterans recently visited Belyy Rast too. In this village an obelisk has been set up in the memory of the fallen sailors and tank troops. On its marble plaque is the inscription: "Here are buried the soldiers, sailors, sergeants, petty officers and officers from the 64th Separate Naval Rifle Brigade and the 24th Tank Brigade who fell in the battles against the Nazi invaders in December 1941." Nearby lies a ship anchor brought from the shores of the Pacific Ocean. To the right of the fraternal grave a stone wall has been erected with a bas relief depicting the attacking sailors. It is a pleasure to note that here the memory of the valorous defenders of the motherland is kept sacred. The school children look after the grave carefully, they decorate it with flowers and take care of the plantings.
- ³ TsVMA, folio 3, file 34321, sheet 31.
- ⁴ Ibid., file 34322, sheets 36-38.
- ⁵ Ibid., folio 243, file 34707, sheet 8.
- ⁶ "Pis'ma tikhokeantsev-frontovikov" [Letters from the Pacific Fleet Combat Veterans], Vladivostok, Izd-vo Boyevaya Vakhta, 1943, p 11.
- ⁷ On the western edge of the village of Kruglovo, on a granite slab of a fraternal grave are inscribed the words: "Eternal memory for the heroes soldiers of the 62d Naval Brigade who fell in battles against the Nazi invaders for the liberation of Lotoshinskiy Rayon in 1941-1942." Here is buried the political leader of the brigade's first battalion, Nikolay Fedorovich Kashnikov who perished heroically in combat.
- ⁸ TsVMA, folio 2566, inv. 5, file 2, sheet 247.
- ⁹ Ibid., folio 243, file 34716, sheet 335.
- ¹⁰ SOVETSKIY FLOT, 5 April 1959.
- ¹¹ F. Ya. Lisitsyn, "V te groznyye gody" [During Those Terrible Years], Voenizdat, 1978, p 29. At present, in Yazykovo there is a fraternal grave in which rest the valorous sailors of the 71st omsbr who fell in the battle for this village.

¹² TsVMA, folio 243, file 34704, sheets 13-14.

¹³ Ibid., sheets 13-16.

¹⁴ Ibid., folio 1, file 8839, sheet 34. After the defeat of the Nazis at Moscow, the brigade was transferred to the Northwestern Front, to the area of Staraya Russa. In 2 months' battles to defeat the 16th German Army, the sailors again demonstrated courage and valor. Many of them died a death of the brave. The brigade commander, Ya. P. Bezverkhov also perished heroically.

¹⁵ TsVMA, folio 1, file 8839, sheet 35.

¹⁶ TsAMO SSSR, folio of the 1st Assault Army, file 12, sheet 146.

¹⁷ TsVMA, folio 243, file 3665, sheet 46.

¹⁸ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1966, p 78.

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Logistical Support

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 60-66

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Arm Gen S. Kurkotkin, deputy minister of defense and chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services: "Rear Services Support of the Troops"]

[Text] The Armed Forces Rear Services, the rear bodies of the fronts and armies operated under exceptionally difficult conditions in the Battle of Moscow. With the outbreak of war it became apparent that the cumbersome, numerous and poorly controllable rear services the bodies of which were scattered at the center and on the fronts did not meet the requirements of modern warfare. In considering this, the GKO in August 1941, adopted a decision to reorganize the Red Army Rear. Painstaking work to carry this out commenced at the center and on the spot. The Main Directorate of the Red Army Rear Services was formed. The position of chief of the rear services was established at the center, on the fronts and in the armies and later also in the formations. The chiefs of the rear were given the rights of the deputy commander for the rear. A staff of the chief of the rear services was organized and later on staffs for the rear services of the armies and fronts. In the army and on the front they began reorganizing the rear bodies and the entire system of logistical and medical support and the centralizing of the control of the rear. But it was not possible to do this quickly. It was essential not only to reorganize the rear bodies but also to continuously and completely supply the troops, that is, reorganize, as they say, on the move. This certainly was the main difficulty and a particular feature in the work of the rear services during the Battle of Moscow.

The rear during that very difficult period was actually just coming into being and particular clarity and teamwork were required in supplying the troops with materiel. The command undertook decisive measures primarily to improve the army and organic

rear, to reorganize the rear units, subunits and facilities, to convert them to the new TOE, to deploy them rationally and echelon them in the defensive operations.

In September, by the start of the defensive engagement at Moscow, by an order of the NKD [People's Commissariat of Defense], field army bases (PAB) were organized in the armies. These included 7 field dumps (instead of the 20 previously existing in the armies), a headquarters and a service company. In the fronts, in the place of stationary dumps, field ones were deployed. All these organizational changes helped to make the rear services, both on the front and army levels, more maneuverable, mobile and controllable.

There were also certain particular features in the deployment of the rear in the Battle of Moscow. According to the prewar views, it was felt that the depth of the front and army rear areas could reach 600-800 km on the defensive with the army dumps deployed 150-200 km behind the front line and the front dumps some 450-600 km. In the course of the defensive battles at Moscow, the depth of the army and front rear areas was greatly reduced. For example, in the 16th, 19th and 20th armies of the Western Front, the rear units and facilities were deployed at a depth up to 40-50 km.¹ The necessity arose of bringing not only the army but also the front rear units and facilities closer to the troops. This was caused both by the proximity of the capital to the front line as well as by the desire to ensure the readiness of the troops to go over to the offensive.

Thus, the questions of organizing rear support which were solved in the course of the Battle of Moscow already basically met the existing operational and rear situation. The rear bodies of the Western Front and armies, proceeding from the specific conditions and not fearing to depart from the old schemes and principles, largely solved the questions of organizing the rear services in a new manner thereby helping to carry out the combat missions set for the troops.

In the logistical support of the troops an enormous role was played by the lines of communications. It was not possible to utilize the railroads and highways with sufficient effectiveness due to their inconvenient placement for the Western Front. They all radiated from Moscow. There were no bypasses to the north and south of the city. In the course of the engagements which developed on the approaches to the capital, the need became apparent of creating a major rail and road ring around Moscow. A ring road some 125 km long was built during the period of the Battle of Moscow. Here around 30 km of it were built from scratch by the road units.² Thus, 10 radial road and 11 rail lines converging on Moscow were interconnected. This ensured the rapid and concealed maneuvering of troops and materiel as well as their passage to the front without entering the capital.

Rear support in the Battle of Moscow had its particular features. Thus, many roads in the rear area of the Western Front were equipped and serviced by the resources of Hq SHC. These roads, in connecting Moscow with the deep rear of the nation, ran through the rear areas of the front and the armies and reached the organic rear areas. As a result the road service of the front equipped and maintained only one military road (VAD) between Moscow and Kubinka with a further extension to Mozhaysk. In the second half of January 1942, for supplying the troops on the left wing of the front a second VAD was equipped between Khanino, Peremyshl', Babynino, Meshchovsk and Mosal'sk. In the armies the VAD had just begun to be organized. In their majority the VAD were an extension of rail lines.

The construction and repair-reconstruction work on the VAD was carried out, as a rule, manually due to the exceptionally little amount of equipment, particularly in winter in clearing snow off the roads. This told on the rate of rebuilding the roads and the time for putting them into operation. Moreover, the lack of road units and subunits did not make it possible at that time to build and operate a sufficient network of VAD in the fronts, let alone in the armies. The then existing system of dual leadership of the roadwork (through the road section of the front and the Main Administration for Highways of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]) did not help in rapidly solving the problems of road support. Considering this, the GKO undertook measures to reinforce the troops with road units. Thus, in December 1941, a decision was adopted to form 50 road battalions for the Western Front (due to the shortage of equipment and motor transport, in January 1942, the front received only 14 battalions), and somewhat later, all the road units of the Main Administration for Highways of the NKVD by the Order of the NKO of 1 July 1942, were to be transferred to the system of Red Army road troops. The elimination of parallelism in the leadership helped to improve road support for the troops.

The high momentum of advance for the troops under modern conditions, their increased need for materiel, the great traffic intensity on the VAD and the great scale of their possible destruction by the enemy demanded the creation of road units with road building equipment capable of successfully building, rebuilding and maintaining the VAD.

As for the questions of *logistical support and transport*, one must first of all point to the broad use of materiel concentrated directly in Moscow. In the capital and the Greater Moscow Area there were not only the central dumps of the NKO, the depots and arsenals with the supplies of the state reserves but also there were many enterprises which produced defense products that could often go directly from the shops to the troops. These were the basic source of troop supply since the enterprises evacuated to the east still were unable to produce a sufficient quantity of defense products.

The rapid advance of the enemy and the retreat of our troops into the interior of the nation, as is known, led to great losses of materiel. The situation of the troops, like the entire nation, became difficult. During those months the level of product output was the lowest. The supply of the Western Front armies with ammunition by the start of the defensive engagement at Moscow was below any standards. At the army and front dumps at that time there was just 0.2-0.3 units of fire for the basic types of ammunition.³ Under these conditions, the economic consumption of materiel assumed important significance. In the troops fixed limits were set for the consumption of ammunition and later also for fuel. Extensive work was done to return to the rear the used cartridges which were manufactured from expensive non-ferrous metals as well as the special wooden carrying boxes. Money prizes and other material and moral incentives were set for the collected cartridges, saved ammunition, fuel or motor life. The measures adopted helped in the course of the defensive engagement not only to replenish current consumption but also to create significant supplies at the army and front dumps and the central bases. By the start of the counteroffensive the troops of the Western Front had 2-3 units of fire for ammunition, 5-6 fuelings and 10-12 daily rations of food and fodder.⁴

Hq SHC and the commanders of the fronts and armies were constantly concerned with the logistical support of the troops, for the rational organization of the rear services and prompt supply. The commander of the Western Front, Arm Gen G. K. Zhukov, in the order of 22 December 1941, pointed out that without the clearly organized operation of the rear services, the best operation could come to naught. In the order he demanded that the army headquarters for the rear services ensure dependable contact with the troops; that the divisions be supplied with motor and cart transport, in finding surplus vehicles in certain units and turning them over to others where there was a shortage; that they not permit violations in the consumption of ammunition, fuel and food and achieve the most rigid economy. Guilty parties were to be held responsible while the thrifty and careful should be commended. The commander of the front recommended that the army military councils move their rear services echelon by echelon in accord with the advance of the army in the necessary instances air-dropping the sections of the army dumps.⁵ Subsequently, the sections of the army dumps in the field--they later came to be called the forward sections of the field army base (GOPAB)--began to be widely used in the course of the war.

In transport the troops received great help from the motor transport units of the Hq SHC Reserve. Some of them were located directly in Moscow or the Greater Moscow Area and constantly kept in their transport a mobile reserve of materiel such as one scale of fire, one fueling, one daily ration of food per rifle division. As this reserve was used up the materiel was constantly replenished.

The experience of creating a mobile reserve of materiel was widely used in all the subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War and undoubtedly would be of important significance under present-day conditions.

At the front and army dumps there was at that time no mechanization for freight handling work. The loading (unloading) of materiel was carried out by hand. A great deal of time was used for this. Moreover, in addition to the TOE rear subunits, this work often involved work teams assigned to the commanders of the units and formations from the combat subunits.

Fuel consumption in the Battle of Moscow was low as the troops had comparatively little equipment, that is, aircraft, tanks, SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] and motor vehicles. At the same time in Moscow and the Greater Moscow Area, there were large supplies of oil products at the various dumps of the NKO and the other people's commissariats. Moreover, fuel was delivered to the Moscow area from the Volga oil depots and from the Caucasus. For this reason there were no major interruptions in fuel supply. For example, on 2 October 1941, supplies for the armies of the Western Front were: 0.3-4.4 fuelings for gasoline, 1.7-4.7 for diesel fuel and 1.5-8.7 for aviation gasoline.⁶ In the course of the defensive engagement, fuel consumption was promptly replenished and by the start of the counteroffensive there were sufficient supplies. For example, on the Western Front the fuel supplies would cover a 35-40-day operation of ground vehicles and 10-12-day operation of aviation. For this reason in the course of the counteroffensive, fuel deliveries to the fronts ordinarily did not cover its consumption. Fuel was supplied to the troops from the supplies organized on the fronts.

Fodder supply for the troops was carried out basically without a halt. The situation was worse for fodder for the artillery, riding and draft horses. The local fodder

supplies were not sufficient and the railroad due to its overburden with operational traffic could not deliver fodder, for example hay, due to the large bulk of this type of freight.

With the onset of the winter cold, in the course of the heavy defensive engagements, the *uniform service* was able to promptly replace the summer uniforms of the men with winter ones. The personnel of the operational army received felt boots, three-quarter length sheepskin coats, padded jackets, loose breeches, fur caps with ear flaps and warm undergarments. Regardless of the difficulties related to the evacuation of the textile enterprises, the nation fully supplied the army with clothing. The enterprises of Moscow and Moscow Oblast alone manufactured 487,000 padded breeches, 264,000 winter gloves, 21,000 padded jackets and many other items.⁷

M. I. Kalinin, in speaking on 11 January 1942, before the party aktiv in the city of Kalinin said: "...Our Red Army is excellently clothed and shod and is not badly fed. This is a fact known to the entire world that our nation has been able to cloth its army better than the Nazis. And in the balance of war this is of very great significance."⁸

For the *medical service* the initial period of the war was very unfavorable. The medical units and facilities lost much personnel and equipment and by the start of the defensive engagement at Moscow were significantly below strength. In the hospitals, as a rule, there were not enough beds and medical evacuation transport. On 2 November 1941, for example, the 5th Army had only four field hospitals with 800 beds, the 16th Army had two with 400 beds and the 33d Army had three with 600 beds.

By the start of the counteroffensive, the situation had abruptly changed. Due to the measures taken by the GKO to organize new hospitals and utilize the bed network of the People's Commissariat of Public Health, the armies of the Western Front already had an average of 12,000 hospital beds and as a total for the front there were around 71,000 of them.⁹

The medical service in the Battle of Moscow for the first time gained great experience in operating in the course of a major engagement and many questions had to be resolved completely in a new manner. For the first time in a short period of time large (for those times) hospital bases of the fronts were set up. Hospitals were also organized for the lightly wounded as well as convalescent teams. The practice started of moving up the army hospitals and these were subsequently named first-line hospitals while the basic forces of the medical service were concentrated in the sector of the main thrust by the front's troops.

The experience of the battles around Moscow suggested that in anticipation of an offensive the medical facilities should move up closer to the troops. This became the rule in all the subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War.

During the Battle of Moscow a great deal of attention was devoted to the *security and defense of the rear units and subunits*. This was organized chiefly with their own forces. Sometimes for the security of particularly important objectives or in escorting valuable cargo, the commanders of the units and formations assigned combat subunits. Security and defense of objects in the operational rear were closely tied to the security and defense of the capital. An important role was also played by the strong air cover for the most important rear objectives.

The control of the rear services in the Battle of Moscow was one of the bottlenecks in the work of the operational rear. The rear bodies of the Western Front had no radios at all. Wire communications could not be employed as widely and effectively as the situation required, particularly with the retreat of the troops. In a number of instances on the defensive and even during the counteroffensive, communication and control of the rear were broken both in the front and in the armies and this led to negative consequences.

In order to better ensure communications and control, the rear services staffs of the fronts and the armies for the first time in the battle of Moscow began to appoint operations groups and liaison officers and send them appropriately to the armies (formations) for passing on instructions and orders, for providing practical aid and for establishing proper order in the rear areas. For example, during the period of intense battles at Tula, in November-December 1941, the staff for the rear services of the Western Front organized an operations group to ensure logistical support for the troops on the left wing. Somewhat later, in breaking through the enemy defenses on the Ruza River, the front reinforced the staff of the rear services of the 20th Army with officers having great experience in organizing troop logistical support. This practice was also developed in other operations of the Great Patriotic War and was applied, of course, considering the specific situation and the conditions of conducting combat operations.

Under present-day conditions, the personal contact of the district deputy commander for the rear services and the officers of his staff with the subordinate services, units and facilities will be one of the major factors in effective control of the rear services.

In the Battle of Moscow effective party political work contributed largely to the successful carrying out of the logistical support problems and this work was conducted by the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations of the rear units, subunits and facilities. Its basic task was to indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of loyalty to the motherland and burning hate for the Nazi invaders.

The men of the rear, like all the Soviet Army, during combat demonstrated courage, mass heroism and high military skill and were ready for self-sacrifice for the sake of rapidly defeating the enemy. In the Battle of Moscow they also committed many heroic feats. Thus, the sergeant of the 1st Railroad Brigade, V. P. Miroshnichenko, blew up a bridge across the Snopot' River over which the Nazi troops were trying to cross. At the price of his life he blocked the enemy's path. For the shown heroism and courage he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The 17-year-old nurse Tamara Kalnina saved the life of 15 wounded soldiers and commanders when enemy aviation attacked a medical vehicle. The courageous patriot was awarded the Order of Lenin.

The feats of the men and the experience of the best specialists in the rear subunits were widely popularized in talks and in the press. The visual and oral agitation constantly reflected the question of what have you done today to supply the front's troops?

In party political work great attention was given to indoctrinating honesty and a careful attitude toward military property and for all types of materiel located at

the dumps and being transported to the troops. The commanders and political workers explained to the personnel the requirements of the laws, the military oath, the manuals and instructions and gave instructive examples of the safeguarding, protecting and defense of military equipment. The political workers and party organizations created a social atmosphere of intolerance for wastefulness in the rear facilities, for attempts to illegally utilize the materiel or instances of the half-hearted carrying out of logistical support missions.

The experience of the rear services in the Battle of Moscow showed that a profound knowledge of the operational and rear situation, the ability to anticipate possible changes in this, the constant contact of the deputy front (army) commander for the rear services and his staff with the combined-arms staff, the close cooperation of the commanders of the branches of troops and the chiefs of the services, the maximum reduction of rear operational documents and the giving of concrete and precise oral and written orders contributed to firm and flexible control of the rear.

In the Battle of Moscow there was a tendency to broaden the functions of the rear services. They not only received military products from the national economy and delivered them to the fronts, fleets and military districts but also began to stockpile and store supplies, prepare them for use, support troop movements and provide preparation, technical support and rebuilding of the major lines of transport.

During the defensive and offensive engagements there was a continuous process of reorganizing the rear bodies at the center and on the spot. Many trends noted in the initial period of the war in the questions of improving the rear services and the principles of their application in combat and operations underwent further development. Thus, the rear units and facilities were brought ever-closer to the troops and the depth of the army and front rears was significantly reduced. There was the ever-wider practice of the centralized employment of motor transport and the means of medical control as well as the maneuvering of the medical units and facilities.

The operation of the rear services in the Battle of Moscow enriched the theory and practice of the Armed Forces Rear Services and showed that the forms and methods of troop rear support cannot be fixed once and for all. These change depending upon the supply of the Army and Navy with military equipment, means of transport, upon the nature of combat operations and the specific situational conditions.

The further development and improvement of the Armed Forces Rear Services and the principles of its organization and work have been carried out considering the rich experience of the Great Patriotic War, the enormous changes constantly occurring in the equipping of the Army and Navy and in the methods and forms of conducting combat operations as well as the trends in the further development of military science and equipment.

FOOTNOTES

TSAMO SSSR, folio 208, inv. 224922, file 1, sheets 111-112, 158-159.

Ibid., folio 67, inv. 26479, file 118.

⁴ "Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voenizdat, 1977, p 92.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ TsAMO SSSR, folio 373, inv. 6652, file 1, sheets 69-70.

⁶ Ibid., folio 208, inv. 2862, file 9, sheets 398-400.

⁷ TsAMO SSSR, folio 87, inv. 235538, file 14, sheet 27.

⁸ M. I. Kalinin, "O kommunisticheskoy vospitanii i voinskoy dolge" [On Communist Indoctrination and Military Duty], Voenizdat, 1967, p 499.

⁹ "Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", p 309.

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Party-Political Work

Moscow VOENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 67-76

[Article by Col Gen G. Sredin, chief of the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin: "Party-Political Work in the Troops"]

[Text] During the period of the battle at the walls of our motherland's capital, as throughout the entire Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party was the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the Nazi invasion and carried out enormous work to strengthen the USSR Armed Forces and their ability to repel the enemy drive and defeat it. Party-political work in the troops was one of the basic areas in these activities. In being guided by Lenin's admonishments, the party saw to it that the work was carried out continuously, purposefully and considering the specific condition that developed on the front. This powerful weapon was aimed at rallying the men around the party, strengthening discipline and order, carrying out the combat orders and at an unstinting struggle to achieve victory over the enemy. Class tenacity and a high ideological level of party political work were ensured by actively propagandizing Lenin's ideas on the defense of the victories of Great October, by explaining the tasks set by the party and the Soviet government to defeat the Nazi invaders and the liberating nature of the Great Patriotic War and by a close link with the life and combat activities of the troops. In the inspired works of Lenin, in the documents of the Communist Party Central Committee and the GKO, the commanders, political workers and party organizations found the answers to how political work must be organized and carried out under the difficult wartime situation, how to provide military and political leadership of the troops, how to incite the defenders of the motherland to fight wholeheartedly against the enemy and to carry out their military duty with honor and dignity.

During the Battle of Moscow, the Communist Party devoted enormous attention to strengthening the party organizations in the operational army as the decisive means of increasing its influence in the masses and in mobilizing them to a wholehearted struggle against the enemy and as a most important condition for increasing the combat capability of the units and subunits. In fighting on the most difficult sectors and carrying out the most crucial assignments, the communists by their personal example inspired the men to a wholehearted struggle for the liberty and independence of the Soviet fatherland. Here the party organizations suffered great losses. In just 6 months of the war, more than 500,000 party members and candidate members were put out of action.¹

In the strengthening of the subunit and unit party organizations on the front an important role was played by the decrees adopted by the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 19 August and 9 December 1941 on changing the by-law conditions for the admitting of soldiers who had distinguished themselves in combat for the party organizations of the operational army.² These documents established that servicemen who had particularly distinguished themselves in battles and who had demonstrated examples of heroism could submit recommendations from three party members who had been in the party for a year and knew them professionally for at least a year while the candidate period was to be reduced to 3 months. The party was guided by the instructions of V. I. Lenin that under the most difficult conditions it was essential "more boldly, more widely and more rapidly" to attract new fighters to the party and to create "without delaying for a single minute, hundreds of new organizations."³

The authority of the communists and party organizations on the front was exceptionally high and their ties with the masses of soldiers became ever-stronger. This can be seen from the increasing influx of new forces into the party organizations of the units and formations. In commenting on this trend, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that "In preparing for combat, thousands of Soviet soldiers requested admission to the party and the testing of courage became their candidate period."⁴ In October-November 1941, around 6,000 applications to join the party and an equal number for the Komsomol were submitted by the men in the troops of the Western Front.⁵

As a result the party and Komsomol organizations were strengthened in organizational and ideological terms and their size increased. In December 1941, almost one out of every four soldiers defending the Soviet capital was a communist.⁶

At the end of December 1941, the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army [GlavPU RKKA] in the directive "On Eliminating Shortcomings in Admission to the VKP(b) and Creating Viable Company Party Organizations,"⁷ drew attention to the necessity of strengthening the growth of the party ranks from the rifle units and improving work in admitting the rank-and-file and sergeants to the party. It set the task of improving all political work of the party organizations as a whole. The carrying out of these instructions activated the work of the party organizations in the operational units and helped to further strengthen their political influence on the personnel.

In addition, upon a decision of the VKP(b) Central Committee, communists and Komsomol members were sent to the troops of the Western Front and the Moscow Defense Zone as political fighters. This made it possible to strengthen the party and Komsomol

organizations of the operational units and to increase party influence in the sub-units directly engaged in combat operations. In being in the very thick of the men and in their majority being rank-and-file, they served as an example of valor and discipline and worthy vanguard in combat. The directive of the chief of the Western Front Political Directorate of 2 December commented that "the basic aim of sending the political fighters into the units is to strengthen the political-moral state of the personnel and to raise the battleworthiness of the units."⁸

In noting the accomplishments of the political fighters in the first, most difficult months of the war, the GlavPU RKKA in October 1941 reported to the party Central Committee that "they played an exceptional role in strengthening the Red Army units."⁹

The Communist Party gave enormous significance to the *ideological and political indoctrination* of the Soviet military. The party Central Committee directed the ideological and political work of the political bodies, commanders and party organizations. To check the rabid drive of the Nazis, to stop the enemy and then defeat it --this required unbending morale, high moral-combat qualities of the Soviet military and iron discipline. The ideological conviction and political awareness of the men and their understanding of the just nature and goals of the Great Patriotic War were a sound basis for the unsurpassed moral and combat qualities of the Soviet military. V. I. Lenin pointed out that "in any war victory ultimately is determined by the morale of those masses which shed their blood on the battlefield."¹⁰ The truth of Lenin's words was reaffirmed at Moscow, when in the course of the defensive engagements the moral strength of the Soviet military personnel became one of the crucial factors in the successful struggle against the strong and perfidious enemy.

Of particular importance was the indoctrinating of the personnel in a spirit of *Soviet patriotism* which gave rise to inexhaustible energy and courage in the struggle against the Nazi invaders. The main sources of it were the socialist social and state system, the Leninist ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and the traditions of our people developed over the age-old struggle against foreign invaders and in the struggle for socialism. The indoctrinating of the men in a spirit of love for the motherland, dedication to the people, to the Communist Party and to the Soviet government, and loyalty to military duty as well as the explaining of the just, liberation nature of the Great Patriotic War played the major role in mobilizing the personnel to defeat the enemy at Moscow.

The military councils, the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations, in being directed by the party's instructions, carried out enormous work in the troops to unmask the misanthropic ideology of fascism and the plans of Nazi Germany to establish world domination. The atrocities of the occupiers on Soviet land were widely taken up in the press, oral propaganda and agitation. A burning hate for the enemies of the motherland was inculcated in the men and it was explained to them that the Nazis intended to deprive the peoples of our nation of their state independence, to exterminate tens of millions of people and to enslave the remainder.

Self-political agitation and the personal example of the communists in combat became the leading form of ideological and political indoctrination of the men in a combat situation. Lt Gen I. S. Lykov, being the commissar of a tank battalion and experiencing his first combat on the fields around Moscow, has written that all the

communists on the front at that time "were united and brought together by one thing, that is, the ability even in the most difficult situation of combat to maintain a presence of mind, to instill in the men a confidence in the final victory over the enemy, and with sincerity and passion to bring the living word of the party into the masses. They were the political fighters of the party and their strongest, most undaunted agitation was the fact that they were the first to go into the attack and, disdaining death, led the attackers forward."¹¹ The Leninist ideas of defending the socialist fatherland, the appeals of the Communist Party and the demands of the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief were explained to the personnel at meetings, political information sessions, in talks and newspapers, in discussing the summaries of Sovinformbyuro [Soviet Information Bureau], the appeals, leaflets and so forth. Examples of intrepidity and heroism and the combat experience of able soldiers and commanders were broadly propagandized in the operational troops.

The appeals of the military councils played a major role in the ideological and political indoctrination of the men and in mobilizing them to carry out the combat missions. Through them the demands of the party and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief were brought to the troops, the military political situation and the specific demands on the men were explained to them and the ways for successfully carrying out the combat orders were indicated. In the appeals, the military councils urged the personnel to equal the heroes in battle, to master military skills and show valor and initiative.

Great political work was carried out in the troops defending Moscow to explain the appeals of the Party Central Committee on the occasion of the 24th Anniversary of Great October. All the front, army and divisional newspapers published them. Some 3,740,000 copies of express leaflets with the party Central Committee appeals were published for the troops defending Moscow.¹²

Of enormous moral and political significance for all our nation, for the Armed Forces and for the defenders of Moscow were the ceremony of the Moscow Soviet together with the Moscow party and public organizations and the traditional military parade on Red Square on 7 November. In appealing to the soldiers and partisans, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin urged them to be worthy of the finest military and revolutionary traditions of our people. "Let the victorious banner of the great Lenin shine on us!"--these words were an inspiring appeal to fight against the Nazi invaders. The content of the holiday report and the speeches at Red Square by the commanders, political workers and party aktiv reached the hearts and minds of the men.

On the day before and on the day of the holiday many of the units defending Moscow were visited by worker delegations from the Moscow enterprises and institutions. They brought presents and letters with the admonishment to steadfastly defend Moscow and mercilessly beat the Nazi invaders. Meetings with the delegations caused great excitement among the personnel, they strengthened the men's forces and raised their morale. The Red Army men and commanders vowed to the Muscovites that their admonishment would be carried out.

The Soviet military kept their promise. In the battles on the approaches to Moscow, the military skill and experience of the men increased and they demonstrated unflinching steadfastness and courage and miracles of bravery. Heroism assumed a mass

scope. An immortal feat was committed at Dubosekovo siding by a group of tank hunters of the 316th Division headed by the company political leader V. G. Klochkov. The heroes stood to the death but did not let the enemy pass. Throughout the nation resounded the words of the political leader expressing the feelings and thoughts of the capital's defenders and all Soviet patriots: "Russia is great but there is nowhere to retreat behind Moscow." The agitators, communists and Komsomol members told the men of them. These words became the combat motto of each man.

Under the conditions of the extremely difficult situation on the front in the initial period of the war, the VKP(b) Central Committee and the GKO adopted a number of measures to strengthen discipline and organization in the troops. In particular the decrees of the GKO of 16 July 1941 and the directive of Hq SHC of 16 August 1941 were specially devoted to these questions. The GKO and Hq demanded that strict measures be adopted against anyone who violated the oath and showed hesitation. Particular responsibility for preventing panic and cowardice was placed on the commanders and political bodies, the communists and Komsomol members. In accord with these documents, the GlavPU RKKA demanded that the political directorates of the fronts, the political sections of the armies and formations work out practical measures aimed at strengthening discipline and combating cowards and panic. The commanders of the units and formations, all the political personnel as well as the staff officers explain the party's instructions on the need to strengthen discipline and they steadfastly carried them out. The questions of strengthening military discipline and order held a major place in the agitation and propaganda work, they were raised at meetings, in reports and talks and were taken up in the military press. The effective indoctrinational and organizational work carried out by the command and the political bodies, by the entire party political apparatus significantly increased the combat capability of the troops. In the course of the battles their organization, steadfastness and stubbornness increased. The enemy suffered great losses and its plans to capture the Soviet capital failed.

In the defensive period, all party political work in the troops around Moscow was aimed at carrying out the demands of the party and its central committee: "Stand to the Death!" and "Not One Step Back!" This work was carried out under the mobilizing slogans: "Strain every force to repel the enemy," "Stop the enemy, defend Moscow!" "We will defeat and destroy the Nazi invaders on the approaches to the capital of the motherland!" and "To hold out at Moscow means to win the war." These were all aimed at carrying out specific combat missions and orders. As a result of the measures adopted by the party Central Committee, the GlavPU RKKA and the military councils of the fronts and armies, party political work assumed great scope, it was carried out continuously, it became purposeful and efficient and was enriched with new experience. Political work in the troops during the defensive battles at Moscow increased the strength and combat activeness of the troops and strengthened their fighting spirit and the confidence of the personnel in the inevitable defeat of the Nazi hordes.

In describing party-political work during the period of the defensive engagements, the commander of the Western Front, G. K. Zhukov, has written: "The front's political directorate and all the political workers did the maximum possible to increase the combat capability of the units and formations and to light in the hearts of the men and the officers a hate for the Nazi occupiers and a belief in our victory."¹³

At the end of November 1941, on the pages of PRAVDA there resounded the confident voice of our party: "The defeat of the enemy should start at Moscow!"¹⁴ By this time, due to the party's efforts, to the labor of all the Soviet people and to the heroism and steadfastness of the soldiers, the necessary prerequisites had been created for the Red Army to go over to a *counteroffensive*. The political bodies were confronted with new responsible tasks of directing the political and organizational activities of the party organizations, the commanders and the political workers to instill and develop an offensive drive and combat activity of the personnel in order to ensure the carrying out of the command's order to defeat the enemy.

The commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations had to bring about a psychological change in the minds of the men who for long months had fought stubborn defensive battles under the slogans: "Stand to the Death!" and "Not a Step Back!" Now confidence had to be instilled in them that the Nazi invaders could not only be checked and stopped but also crushed in decisive offensive battles, driven back and destroyed. All political and indoctrinational work in the troops was now directed at this. It was explained to the personnel that they were confronted with the historic mission of starting the liberation of the homeland from the Nazi enslavers.

The indoctrination of hate for the Nazi invaders in the men helped to strengthen the offensive drive of the troops. In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the appeal "Death to the German Occupiers!" the GlavPU RKKA instructed all the military press bodies on 11 December 1941 to publish this appeal on the first page of each issue of the newspapers and other publications.

In the troops a great deal was done to strengthen mass political work in the units and subunits to improve agitation and propaganda, and in particular to carry out the directive of the Soviet Army GlavPU [Main Political Directorate] of 7 December 1941 which demanded that the military commissars and political bodies focus on verbal propaganda and pay it unflagging attention in the course of the engagements. This document obliged the leadership and the political workers to be constantly in touch with the men, to bring them the living word of the party, to explain to them the military-political situation, the tasks of the Soviet Army to defeat the enemy, the sources of strength of our state and its Armed Forces as well as to take an active part in the indoctrination of the men.

In accord with the instructions of the Soviet Army GlavPU, in December 1941, agitation-propaganda collectives were again organized in the units and subunits and the composition of the subunit agitators was revised. By the middle of January 1942, in the 5th Army of the Western Front there were over 2,000 of them (85 percent of them were communists and Komsomol members), while in the 33d Army there were 3,500 agitators, over one-half of which was communists and Komsomol members.

In the offensive battles the content of agitation and propaganda was enriched and its forms improved. Now moving to the forefront was the task of indoctrinating the personnel in an offensive drive and the broad propagandizing of the successes of our troops on the offensive and their combat experience. For example, on the second day of the counteroffensive, the military council of the 31st Army published and distributed a leaflet on the successful breakthrough of the enemy defenses and the losses caused it. It pointed out the able actions of the infantrymen, artillery,

tank troops and fliers. The leaflet urged that the first successes be reinforced and that they advance more boldly and rapidly without allowing the enemy pause.¹⁵

The *propagandizing of combat feats* greatly increased troop morale. Talks were held in the units and formations and leaflets put out telling about the military deeds. The political section of the 4th Tank Brigade each day issued mimeographed combat leaflets. One of them was devoted to the feat of the tank crew of D. F. Lavrenenko which in battle had destroyed a gun, 10 motorcycles, a staff vehicle, several mortars, machine guns and up to a company of enemy infantry.¹⁶

In the propaganda a major place was given to demonstrating the actions of the first guards units and formations as these comprised the flower of our army and served as a model for all the troops. Using the examples of the bold actions of the guards units of Maj Gen I. N. Russiyanov, the cavalymen of Maj Gen L. M. Dovator and the tank troops from the 1st Guards Tank Brigade of Maj Gen M. Ye. Katukov, the commanders and political workers instilled in the men unflinching steadfastness, endurance and the ability to carry out a combat order, they raised their offensive spirit and taught them the skillful use of weapons. Each order of Hq SHC on the transforming of one or another unit into a guards one quickly became known to all. Meetings and talks were held in the units and formations. Newspapers devoted entire columns to describing the heroic feats of the guardsmen, they printed numerous greetings from the workers of our nation to the men and urged that the glorious traditions be continued.

The unity of the army and the people and the moral-political and material support for the Red Army from the rear workers were an inexhaustible source of inspiration for the Soviet military. They supplied the front not only with military equipment, weapons and ammunition but also helped in strengthening the patriotic mood. The confidence of the people in victory and the total belief in the wisdom of the Communist Party's leadership were transmitted to the soldiers through numerous channels and threads linking the front and the rear and were embodied in courageous and self-sacrificing actions on the battlefield.

In the course of the counteroffensive at Moscow, the nation learned of numerous instances of atrocities and crimes by the Nazi occupiers. The men saw the traces of their crimes in the burned Soviet towns and villages, the destroyed enterprises and plundered kolkhozes. Among the documents captured in the destroyed staffs of the enemy units were orders and directives showing that the extermination of Soviet persons was being carried out by the Nazis according to the plans and orders of the German High Command. At numerous meetings which often arose spontaneously in the course of the counteroffensive in population points won back from the enemy, the men expressed their anger and indignation with the Nazis' crimes. "One's blood freezes when one looks at the Nazi crimes," wrote the men of the 1,203d Regiment of the 354th Division in the resolution adopted at a meeting in liberated Istra.¹⁷

The press was used as an effective means for the ideological and political indoctrination of the Soviet troops. The army newspapers and magazines effectively informed the men on the major events in the life of the front and rear. In December 1941, on the Western Front alone 96 newspapers and journals were published with a total run of 332,500 copies.¹⁸ The front, army and divisional newspapers widely propagandized the courageous actions of the men, they told of their increased combat skill,

they described the strong and weak points of the enemy and instilled confidence in the inevitability of its defeat. The newspaper of the Western Front KRASNOARMEY-SKAYA PRAVDA ran a permanent heading "Heroes of the Great Patriotic War" which was highly regarded by the commanders, political workers and all the personnel.

The political directorates of the fronts published large runs of leaflets, appeals, instructions and exhortations which disclosed the goals and nature of the war, unmasked the essence of German fascism and its aggressive plans and popularized the heroism of the Soviet military. The communists and agitators in the subunits actively used the materials published in the newspapers, journals and leaflets in their own daily talks and political information sessions.

Mass cultural work was also subordinate to the tasks of indoctrinating the men in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and hate for the enemy and to developing high moral-combat qualities and an offensive drive in them. Theater collectives and concert brigades were sent out to the troop units fighting around Moscow. The agitation train organized by the Moscow workers carried out extensive agitation and propaganda work on the Western Front. Agitation vehicles existed under the front political directorates and the political sections of certain armies. Their small staff effectively organized lectures, reports, concerts and the showing of films for the men, using pauses which occurred in combat for this and the withdrawal of various units to the second echelon.

During the offensive the political bodies showed great concern for promptly informing the personnel about the situation on the front, about international events and about the heroic deeds of the Soviet people. The front political directorates devoted great attention to the local radio broadcasts which widely described the heroism of the Soviet military. The front broadcast "Western Front Speaking" in December 1941 and January 1942 gave 22 talks devoted to the combat deeds of the front's units.²¹

Of an enormous, truly inestimable influence on the men was the *personal example* in combat set by the commanders and political workers, the communist and Komsomol members, their constant contact with the soldiers and the just word of the party.

The total dedication to the cause of the Communist Party on the part of the commissars, the political leaders and communists of the Western, Northwestern and Kalinin fronts which carried out the basic tasks in the counteroffensive and their personal courage inspired the men and increased the political awareness and responsibility for carrying out the combat mission. Fully applicable to them are the words of L. I. Brezhnev: "They brought our soldiers the party's word and inspired them to a heroic and self-sacrificing struggle. From the political leader to the military council member, they were where it was most difficult, strengthening the men's confidence in the triumph of our just cause and instilling in them courage, will power and intrepidity."²²

Characteristic was a continuous impact of the commanders and political workers on the broad masses of the men directly in the battle formations and their constant reliance in indoctrinational work on the broad circle of the party and Komsomol aktiv. Any opportunity was used for contact with the men, for a personal influence on them during difficult minutes of combat and for commending outstanding men. A matter of

particular concern for the political bodies and workers was the units and subunits fighting on particularly crucial sectors and under the most difficult conditions. Being on the first line, the officers of the front political directorates, the political sections of the armies and divisions, the commissars and other political workers from the units and subunits continuously carried out political and organizational work, they took a direct part in battle, setting a personal example of valor and self-sacrifice in carrying out the combat missions.

During the period of the offensive battles around Moscow, the military councils and political bodies continued to give great attention to increasing the ranks of the party and Komsomol. This was due to the fact that the party and Komsomol organizations had suffered great losses. Thus, in the 16th Army, in December twice as many communists were lost as entered the unit party organizations over the same time, while in the 5th Army this difference was even greater, with the loss of party members being 2,082 men.²³

The increased attention to selecting soldiers who had distinguished themselves in battles and who desired to join the party made it possible to strengthen the subunit party organizations. For example, while in January 1942, the party organizations of the 3d Assault Army admitted 248 men as members and candidate members, in February the figure was already 1,024 and in March 2,016 men.²⁴

The strengthening of the Komsomol organizations was seriously influenced by the decree of the Komsomol Central Committee of 25 December 1941. This provided an opportunity to settle the questions of admission to the Komsomol at sessions of the company Komsomol organization presidium in bypassing a meeting, with the subsequent confirmation at the bureau of the primary organization. Where there was no Komsomol organization presidium, new members could be admitted directly by the primary organization bureau with subsequent approval by the military commissar of the regiment or separate battalion.

In preparing for the counteroffensive and in the course of it, the political bodies carried out great work to train the secretaries of the unit party and Komsomol bureaus, the subunit party and Komsomol organizers in conducting political work in offensive combat. Along with the seminars and meetings, a major role in their instruction was played by individual instructing and practical aid from the political bodies in organizing indoctrination directly in the subunits.

During the period of the counteroffensive in the political work in the troops extensive use was made of oral agitation, particularly such forms as political information, group and individual talks and when the situation permitted, also meetings. Of very important significance were the talks of the communists on the specific missions in combat and on what manner the commander's combat order could better be carried out. Visual agitation assumed a clearly expressed offensive nature.

The presenting of red flags and pennants to the subunits had a great influence on maintaining a high militant drive. The right to hoist them in the liberated population points had to be won in battle. Such a form of political work was widespread in the 5th Guards, 119th and 336th Rifle divisions and other formations and units.²⁵ In the subsequent periods of the Great Patriotic War this assumed a stable and mass nature.

The political bodies adopted measures to strengthen political work with the personnel in the rear units and subunits. This was aimed at promptly providing the troops with everything necessary for offensive combat, for providing aid to the wounded and replenishing material supplies and rebuilding military equipment.

The great and intense work carried out by the military councils, the commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in the troops during the period of the defensive battles at Moscow, the counteroffensive and subsequent general winter offensive was one of the crucial factors ensuring a crushing defeat of the enemy around the walls of the Soviet capital and which marked the beginning to a fundamental turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

The defensive battles, the counteroffensive and the offensive at Moscow showed the necessity of being constantly concerned with the *indoctrination and training of the political personnel*. This was particularly important since at the start of the war the troops had received a large number of political workers called up from the reserves without profound knowledge of military affairs. They had not mastered the forms and methods of party political work in a combat situation. The military councils and political bodies organized this work in the course of the battles and taught the political workers to skillfully direct political work at carrying out specific tasks and to conduct it actively and purposefully.

As combat experience was acquired, the work style of the commanders, political workers and party organizations was improved. Great effectiveness and flexibility were shown in defining the content, forms and methods of party political work in accord with the situational conditions and the nature of the tasks to be carried out and the continuity and high effectiveness of this work were ensured.

In the historic Battle of Moscow the enormous influence of active, purposeful party political work in the troops was clearly demonstrated. During the period of the defensive battles and in the counteroffensive, the commanders, political bodies and party organizations acquired great experience in organizing political work in major offensive operations which were subsequently widely employed. The Great Patriotic War demonstrated, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has pointed out, that "party-political work with the personnel and their ideological tempering have always been and remain a powerful weapon of our army. The strength of this weapon has been tested in the fire of battles. And at present it terrifies our enemies."²⁷

The improving of party-political work in the Armed Forces under present-day conditions organically includes a profound study, generalization and introduction of the rich frontline experience which has not lost its importance even now.

In carrying out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the commanders, political bodies and party organizations are hard at work indoctrinating the personnel. Propaganda of the heroism of the Great Patriotic War, the successes of the Soviet people in communist construction and the plans for the nation's economic and social development for 1981-1985 and for the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan as approved by the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and ratified by the Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet helps to instill in the men a pride for the socialist fatherland, it inspires them to achieve new, higher goals in military and political training and strengthens an awareness of the historic responsibility to protect the motherland against aggressors.

The main thing in party-political work has been and remains the constant concern for increasing the combat readiness and capability of the Armed Forces and their combat potential. This is particularly important in light of the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress that at present adventurism and a readiness to jeopardize the vital interests of mankind for the sake of narrow selfish interests are particularly apparent in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ See Yu. P. Petrov, "Stroitel'stvo politorganov, partiynykh i komsomol'skikh organizatsiy armii i flota (1918-1968)" [The Construction of Political Bodies, Party and Komsomol Organizations in the Army and Navy (1918-1968)], Voenizdat, 1968, p 281.
- ² See "Kommunisticheskaya partiya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [The Communist Party in the Great Patriotic War. Documents and Materials], Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 55, 61.
- ³ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 9, p 304.
- ⁴ L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskii kursom" [By the Leninist Path], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 129.
- ⁵ See KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 22, 1971, p 42.
- ⁶ See "Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, Vol 5, Book 1, p 240.
- ⁷ TsAMO SSSR, folio 32, inv. 920265, file 4, sheet 343.
- ⁸ Ibid., folio 208, inv. 2614, file 1, sheet 164.
- ⁹ Ibid., folio 32, inv. 11296, file 264, sheet 88.
- ¹⁰ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 121.
- ¹¹ I. S. Lykov, "V groznyy chas" [In the Terrible Hour], Voenizdat, 1979, p 4.
- ¹² TsAMO SSSR, folio 32, inv. 440026, file 209, sheets 39-40.
- ¹³ "Bitva za Moskvu" [The Battle of Moscow], Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1966, p 66.
- ¹⁴ See PRAVDA, 27 Nov 1941.
- ¹⁵ "Partiino-politicheskaya rabota v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945" [Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces during the Years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voenizdat, 1968, p 168.

- ¹⁶ TsAMO SSSR, folio 208, inv. 2433, file 3, sheet 350.
- ¹⁷ "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya," Voenizdat, 1970, p 133.
- ¹⁸ TsAMO SSSR, folio 208, inv. 11319, file 7, sheet 112.
- ¹⁹ [not in text]
- ²⁰ [not in text]
- ²¹ "Ideologicheskaya rabota KPSS na fronte (1941-1945 gg.)" [Ideological Work of the CPSU on the Front (1941-1945)], Voenizdat, 1960, p 84.
- ²² L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom," Vol 1, pp 131-132.
- ²³ "Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota....," pp 164-165.
- ²⁴ Ibid., p 166.
- ²⁵ Ibid., p 172.
- ²⁶ [not in text]
- ²⁷ L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom," Vol 2, p 51.

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COMMENTS ON THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY

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[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences I. Shinkarev: "Born in the Battles against Fascism (on the 40th Anniversary of the Yugoslav People's Army)"]

[Text] Yugoslav People's Army was created in the course of the struggle of the Yugoslav people for their national and social liberation during the years of World War II. It arose out of the partisan detachments set up by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia [CPU] under the conditions of the occupation of the nation by the troops of the fascist coalition and with significant military forces among the collaborators.

During the summer and autumn of 1941, the Yugoslav partisans achieved significant successes. However the experience of the struggle showed that the partisan detachments in their actions were tied down to a certain territory and could not move freely and conduct engagements away from their base areas. Considering this the Supreme Staff of the Partisan Detachments headed by Josip Broz Tito decided, along with reinforcing the partisan detachments, to begin to organize regular army units and formations.

On 22 December 1941, in the town of Rudo which is in the wooded mountains of Eastern Bosnia the subunits of a number of partisan detachments met and before them the order of the Supreme Staff was announced on setting up the first Proletarian Brigade. This event marked the beginning of creating the regular People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (PLA). For this reason, each year 22 December is celebrated as Yugoslav People's Army Day.

Like the other European peoples, the struggle of the Yugoslav people against the Nazi invaders intensified particularly with the events on the Soviet-German Front. The victories of the Soviet Army at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk and then its victorious offensive in 1944 led to the defeat of the basic forces of Hitler Germany and its allies. They played a decisive role in the weakening, shaking and final elimination of the entire system of the Nazi occupation regime in the captive nations, they raised the fighting spirit of the peoples in these states, instilled in them hope for a quick liberation and end of the war and encouraged them to stiffen resistance.

In fighting against the German and Italian occupiers, the PLAY grew and became stronger both in combat and organizational terms. In November 1942, the formation of divisions and corps was started. By the end of the year, 9 divisions and 2 corps had already been organized and these included 38 brigades numbering in their ranks some 150,000 soldiers along with the partisan detachments. In September 1944, when the Soviet Army reached the frontiers of Yugoslavia, the PLAY included 50 divisions divided among 15 corps with a total number of around 400,000 men.

Initially the size of the divisions and corps varied. In 1942-1943, a division had an average of 3,000-4,000 men and in 1944, 5,000-6,000 men. It usually consisted of 3 brigades, an artillery battery or battalion, signals, intelligence and combat engineer subunits as well as staff subunits and rear services. The divisions were named for the kray or oblast where they had been formed. In all the subunits there were party organizations and organizations of the Communist Youth League.

In the course of the struggle against the occupiers, the PLAY inscribed glorious pages in the heroic history of its people. It fought on the Neretva River in February-March 1943 and in May of the same year in the Sutjeski River valley drove off several offensives by major German and Italian forces and liberated many regions of the nation from the occupiers.

The liberation struggle for the Yugoslav peoples was simultaneously a victorious socialist revolution as well which deprived the bourgeoisie of power, eliminated the capitalist system and established a new, people's democratic power.

The Soviet Union provided moral support to the Yugoslav patriots and granted military and material aid. Soviet troops played a major role in liberating Yugoslavia from the Nazi invaders. The radio station Free Yugoslavia which had begun to operate in Moscow in November 1941 played an important role in disseminating the truth on the heroism of the Yugoslav patriots and the traitorous role of the followers of Draza Mihajlovic. The USSR recognized the National Liberation Committee which was formed in November 1943 as the provisional government of Yugoslavia.

At the start of 1944, the Soviet government and the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia, exchanged military missions for establishing direct contact between the Soviet Army and the PLAY. This exchange was the logical development of military cooperation established from the very first days of the joint struggle of the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples against the common enemy. It helped to establish clearer coordination of the combat operations as well as to provide further Soviet aid to the new Yugoslavia in the form of weapons, ammunition, military equipment and other materiel.

Units and formations of Yugoslav troops were organized on Soviet territory. During the war an infantry brigade, a tank brigade, as well as ground attack and fighter air regiments were organized, armed, trained and turned over to the PLAY Command. PLAY Command personnel was trained in the Soviet Army military schools.

During the third week of September 1944, talks were held in Moscow between Josip Broz Tito and I. V. Stalin. In the course of them agreement was reached on the entry of large Soviet Army formations into Yugoslav territory for jointly (along with the PLAY troops) liberating the nation of the Nazi invaders. Moreover, the

Soviet government agreed, in the aim of strengthening the PLAY, to put under the Yugoslav Command an air group consisting of ground attack and fighter air divisions as well as weapons for 12 infantry divisions and 2 air divisions. A large group of Soviet officers was sent as instructors to the PLAY troops.

The high combat qualities of the Yugoslav Army were apparent in the Belgrad Operation conducted by the troops of the 3d Ukrainian Front, the PLAY and the Fatherland Front of Bulgaria on 28 September--20 October 1944. In it the main thrust was made by the 57th Army and the IV Guards Mechanized Corps from the Third Ukrainian Front from the area of Radojevac, Kula and Vidin in the general direction of Belgrad.¹ The Nazi Command undertook every measure to hold on to Belgrad, an important strategic point in the Balkans. However, nothing could stop the Soviet and Yugoslav troops. On 14 October, they commenced the storming of the city and on 20 October had fully captured it.

In the course of the operation, the Yugoslav troops, in cooperating closely with the Soviet ones, gained significant experience in conducting offensive operations. This operation had a major impact on the further improving of PLAY structure and the nature of its combat operations in the concluding stage of the war. By the beginning of 1945, the PLAY to a significant degree had been rearmed with Soviet weapons. All of this made it possible for it by the middle of May to fully clear Yugoslav territory of the Nazi occupiers. By this time the Yugoslav armed forces consisted of 4 armies, 59 infantry divisions and 2 air divisions, naval units, higher military bodies and a military territorial command. The overall size of the Yugoslav Army reached almost 800,000 men.

In commenting on the role of the USSR in the liberation of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito emphasized: "Our peoples highly regard the contribution made by the USSR and its glorious army which during the fatal years of the war bore the greatest burden and played the crucial role in the victory over the dark forces of fascism. We also will not forget the thousands upon thousands of Soviet soldiers who shoulder to shoulder with our men shed their blood and gave up their lives on the battlefields of Yugoslavia."²

During the years of postwar socialist development, the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA)³ has gone a great way in improving and modernization. Due to the socialist industrialization of the nation it has been possible to establish production of many types of modern military equipment and weapons and basically meet the requirements of the armed forces for rifle and artillery weapons and ammunition. Good barracks, firing ranges, airfields and ports have been built. Extensive work has been done to train and retrain command personnel, new manuals and regulations have been worked out and put into effect, reflecting the experience of the people's liberation struggle and the requirements of modern warfare. All of the Armed Services, branches of troops and services have undergone further development and a unified system of military control and command has been created.

Extensive cooperation has been carried out between the USSR and Yugoslavia in the areas of the economy, science and technology, culture, tourism and other spheres. The ties are also growing stronger between the armed forces of both nations. Of important significance for strengthening them are the exchange of military delegations, the reciprocal visits of naval ships, the joint elaboration of military

History works and other measures. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in the foreword to the Yugoslav edition of "Malaya Zemlya" has written: "The blood shed jointly in the great battle against the Nazi enslavers has united our peoples forever."⁴

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ SVE [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 1, Voenizdat, 1976, pp 422, 423.
- ² Tito, Josip Broz, "Izbrannyye stat'i i rechi" [Selected Articles and Speeches], Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p 262.
- ³ In the spring of 1945, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia was renamed the Yugoslav Army and from December 1951, it began to be called the Yugoslav People's Army.
- ⁴ L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskiy kurs" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 7, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 56.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ABOUT NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

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[Review by Docent, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col V. Karnoukhov of the book "K vostoku i zapadu ot Suetsa" (To the East and West of Suez) by L. I. Medvedko, Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, 368 pages]

[Text] The book by L. I. Medvedko analyzes the problems of contemporary political and military history in the Near and Middle East. It helps the readers and specialists in making their way through the maze of events in the Arab world over the postwar period.

The author for many years has worked as a journalist in the nations of the Near and Middle East and was an eye-witness of those processes which were developing there. A good knowledge of the work by Soviet and foreign specialists on the Near and Middle East has made it possible for him to write a just book about the struggle of the peoples in the Arab states against the forces of imperialism and aggression, for their national independence and liberty.

The work analyzes the military strategic significance of the Near and Middle East and brings out the reasons for such close "attention" to it by American imperialism. The author rightly comments that "the military strategy of neocolonialism does not go beyond the self-contained vicious circle of imperialist policy, be it expressed as the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' or 'Carter Doctrine'" (p 3). Nor has the current Near and Middle East policy of the Reagan Administration escaped from this "vicious circle."

Of great interest is the analysis of events in the "triple" aggression (England, France and Israel) against Egypt in 1956, the predatory Israeli war against the Arab states in 1967 and the October war of 1973.

In tracing the events of the last war, the author brings out its particular features. In actuality, initially the Egyptians achieved significant successes and during the first 6 hours at a price of few casualties not exceeding 100 men captured the famous "Bar Levi Line." Then Sadat and the people around him showed strange slowness and lost the initiative. In justifying his traitorous actions afterwards, Sadat stated that supposedly the USSR had delivered Egypt "obsolete weapons" which supposedly were inferior to the weapons of the Israeli Army (p 217). But this lie

has been repudiated by data of the London Institute for Strategic Studies. Egypt by the start of the war surpassed Israel in terms of the number of personnel, in terms of tanks, artillery, mortars, antiaircraft missile complexes and was almost as strong in terms of the number of combat aircraft. The armament of the Egyptian Army in terms of its tactical and technical performance was in no way inferior to the corresponding models of Western military equipment used by the Israelis. Thus, the main reasons for the failures of Egypt in the war are to be found not in the quantitative and qualitative indicators for the weapons but rather in the poor leadership of the troops and the traitorous plans of Sadat (p 219). After this war the traitorous line of Sadat can be followed with particular clarity. Under U.S. patronage he set out to split the Arab world and make a separate deal with Israel.

During the last period of his rule, Sadat more and more sided with and sold out to the imperialist, Zionist circles which were increasing tension in the Near East and working to undermine international peace and security. The systematically carried out measures to worsen and curtail Soviet-Egyptian relations became a component part in this political course of the Egyptian leadership.¹ Such a foreign policy by Sadat was a logical extension of those traitorous steps which he had undertaken earlier and this was correctly judged in the reviewed work.

The book's author lifts the curtain on the monstrous crimes carried out by the Zionists, their overseas protectors and supporters against the Arab peoples for whom the Israeli aggressors have caused infinite suffering and hardship, they have destroyed their homes and cultural monuments and driven them from their homeland.

L. I. Medvedko describes the reasons and the essence of the Palestinian tragedy and shows the cruelty and inhumaneness in the actions of the Zionists to "cleanse" various areas of Palestine of the Arabs. Thus, terrorists from the Zionist Stern and Irgun organizations caused a bloody incident in the Arab village of Deir-Yassin where 254 persons were killed, including many women and children (p 141). Similar crimes were carried out then on a mass scale and are now being perpetuated with even greater cruelty on the occupied lands of Palestine and in other Arab states which have been subjected to air raids and strikes by army and naval artillery of the Begin bands.

In the book a large place is given to unmasking the aggressive policy of the United States and other Western powers vis-a-vis the Arab states with progressive regimes. Using specific facts it is proven that if it were not for the complete support of the United States and if there were not the continuous influx of dollars and weapons into Israel, this small Zionist-militaristic state would not behave so provocatively.

The USSR and the nations of the socialist commonwealth have carried out and are carrying out an honest, firm and consistently international policy in the Near and Middle East, in supporting the progressive regimes of Arab states.

Unfortunately the work also has shortcomings. The author somewhat abuses references to foreign sources, at times not using important documents of our party and government on the given problem. Thus, it does not sufficiently reflect the Decree of the June (1967) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Policy of the USSR Vis-a-Vis Israeli Aggression in the Near East" and the Declaration of the 24th CPSU Congress "For a Just and Lasting Peace in the Near East." The nature of U.S. and

Israeli relationships is not gotten across with complete accuracy. The author talks about the "frankly pro-Israeli course of the United States in its Near Eastern Policy" (p 84) and of the "independent role" of Israel as the "policeman" in the struggle against the Arab liberation movement or a frightening armored fist to be used against neighboring Arab states (p 85). Such an assertion differs from the view given in the Decree of the June (1967) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee where it clearly states: "The aggression of Israel is a result of a conspiracy among the most reactionary forces of international imperialism, primarily the United States, aimed against one of the detachments of the national liberation movement, against the progressive Arab states which have set out on a path of progressive socioeconomic changes in the interests of the workers and which are carrying out an antiimperialist policy."² The CPSU Central Committee views Israeli aggression as a link in the overall policy chain of the militant imperialist circles which are endeavoring to halt the historic advance of the cause of national independence, democracy, peace and socialism. However, regardless of the designated shortcomings, the book by L. I. Medvedko makes a contribution to elaborating one of the most complex and acute problems in the modern world. It will make it possible for the readers to be even more convinced of the wisdom of the policy of our party and Soviet government vis-a-vis the liberated nations, a policy which has been reinforced and further developed in the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress: "The CPSU in the future will consistently carry out a policy of developing cooperation between the USSR and the liberated nations and of strengthening the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement."³

FOOTNOTES

² PRAVDA, 18 September 1981.

³ "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh...", Vol 9, pp 283-284.

⁴ "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 15.

ABSTRACT: "Voenno-istoicheskiv zhurnal", 1981

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REPORTS FROM READERS' CONFERENCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) p 87

[Article published under the heading "Current Events, Facts, Findings" by Col N. Dovbenko: "At Readers' Conferences"]

[Text] In 1981, conferences were held for the readers of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in the Red Banner Kiev and Order of Lenin Leningrad military districts, in the Group of Soviet Troops in Germany and the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The participants in the conferences commented that the materials published in the journal provide substantial help to the commanders and political workers in carrying out the tasks of military and political training in the units and formations as well as training the students and indoctrinating the men.

At the same time the readers voiced a number of requests which come down basically to the following: to publish more materials on the pages of the journal on the carrying out of joint operations by the Armed Services in the various theaters of war during the years of the last war, on the rapid preparation of operations and engagements and on the use of various branches of troops, the rear services and the organization of party political work under special conditions. Mention was also made of the need to increase the number of articles to help the instructors of the history of military art and on the organization of communications and cooperation between the ground troops and naval forces, between the branches of troops and airborne troops and aviation. The speakers drew attention to the publishing of materials on countering the danger of mines and other questions of naval operations during the war years as well as the publishing of articles devoted to the experience of local wars.

Requests were also voiced to publish articles devoted to the military aspects of specific Lenin works and to publish more materials of a historical nature on the moral bases of Soviet military discipline, on the key questions of indoctrinational work with various categories of servicemen, articles analyzing the experience of employing mobile groups of fronts and armies in the last war and on the questions of tactics, particularly of a meeting encounter and pursuit, raiding and other independent actions of the units and subunits.

The journal's editors cordially thank all the participants in the reader conferences.

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DEFENSE OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 87-88

[Article published under the heading: "Current Events, Facts, Findings" by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Col V. V. Merkulov: "Defense of a Doctoral Dissertation"]

[Text] In September 1980, a specialized council on the awarding of academic degrees in the philosophical sciences under the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin unanimously voted to award Capt 1st Rank V. I. Golubev the academic degree of Doctor of Philosophical Sciences in the specialty of the theory of scientific communism (military problems) for his submitting for defense the dissertation on "Military Aspects of the Neocolonial Policy of Imperialism." In being guided by the Marxist-Leninist methodology and in relying on the achievements of Soviet science, the author of the dissertation has systematically studied the military neocolonial policy of imperialism. In his work basic attention has been paid to philosophical and sociological analysis.

Considering the increased importance of working out the methodological problems for studying "military" neocolonialism, the author correctly discloses the particular features of applying the universal principles of the Marxist-Leninist method in studying the military aspects of the neocolonial policy of the imperialist powers. On the basis of this the dissertation provides an analysis on three levels. Neocolonialism is examined as an integrated system arising out of modern state-monopolistic capitalism under the conditions of the existence of two opposite systems, the fundamental change in the balance of forces on the world scene and the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. In bringing out the plunderous, exploiting nature of neocolonialism, the author focuses attention on its new traits and manifestations characteristic for the 1970's.

On the second level, there is a profound examination of the place, economic, political, ideological and military doctrine principles, the functions and the socio-class essence of "military" neocolonialism, and a scientific solution is offered to the question of its typology. Here the military aspects of the neocolonial policy of imperialism are disclosed in an organic relationship to the socioeconomic, political and ideological aspects of neocolonial strategy. In fact for the first time the problem has been posed of the patterns of "military" neocolonialism, and a complex mechanism has been demonstrated for the patterns underlying the rise,

functioning and evolution of the military neocolonial policy. Pertinent also are an analysis of the relationship of the objective and subjective in such a policy, the characteristics of the basic forms of military neocolonial relationships imposed by the imperialist powers on a number of developing countries and the contradictory effect of military neocolonial policy on the world revolutionary process and the sociopolitical situation in the liberated states.

On the third level there has been an examination of the basic components of "military" neocolonialism and the convoluted system of their relationships. The author views the socioclass content and particular features of the neocolonial wars as a new variety of imperialist local wars. He describes their basic types and social consequences. Of undoubted interest is the analysis of the causes of neocolonial wars. The work thoroughly examines the questions of the use of armed violence by the imperialist circles in their policy of the "covert" exporting of neocolonial orders and the "diplomacy of intimidation" vis-a-vis the developing states as well as the military aspects of "collective" neocolonialism. One should note the analysis of the new phenomena in the policy of the neocolonialists aimed at establishing control over the armed forces of certain Asian, African and Latin American countries in the aim of turning their armies into a weapon for suppressing the struggle for true independence and social progress.

On a basis of studying the military neocolonial policy of the United States and certain other NATO powers, the author discloses the factors which have had a decisive effect on its formation and evolution since World War II and proposes a solution to the question of its periodization. This, in turn, has created an opportunity to disclose the trends in the evolution of military neocolonial strategy and tactics as well as the general principles and particular features in utilizing armed violence in the neocolonial aims of the U.S. administration. The dissertation contains an analysis of the role of the "Chinese factor" in American neocolonial policy and points out the basic means by which the imperialist reaction is utilizing China in the interests of exporting counterrevolution into the liberated nations.

The dissertation is permeated with a spirit of party loyalty. It contains a fundamental critical assessment of bourgeois apologetic theories which establish and justify military neocolonial expansion. The author has devoted serious attention to unmasking the concepts and practice of the hegemonistic Chinese leadership which has allied with the most reactionary forces of imperialism and has become, in essence, its ally in exporting neocolonialism.

On the basis of studying the military aspects of imperialism's neocolonial policy, the author makes generalizations, conclusions and practical recommendations aimed at raising the methodological level of studying the military neocolonial course of the imperialist powers, at enriching the content of ideological work in the area of unmasking the antipopular, counterrevolutionary essence and rapacious nature of all varieties of neocolonialism and at activating political indoctrination to explain their danger for the fate of many peoples, for detente and for universal peace.

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VIEWS ON THE BATTLE OF MOSCOW

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 89-90

[Unattributed article: "Statements on the Battle of Moscow"]

[Text] Prominent Soviet Political, State and Military Leaders

I. V. Stalin ("O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuza" [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], 5th Edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1948, pp 63-64)

...The Red Army, having repelled the attack of the Germans against Moscow, has taken up the initiative and gone over to the offensive.... It cannot be considered an accident that the German troops which made a triumphal march through all of Europe and in a single blow felled the French troops which were considered crack troops encountered a true military rebuff only in our nation and not only a rebuff but under the blows of the Red Army were forced to retreat from the occupied positions more than 400 km, discarding along the route of retreat a colossal amount of weapons, vehicles and ammunition. The winter conditions of the war in no way alone can explain this fact.

L. I. Brezhnev ("Leninskim kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 125-126)

The defense of Moscow had become a cause of all the Soviet people.... On 7 November 1941, the troops which had arrived to defend the capital, including the famous Siberian divisions, went directly from the parade on Red Square to the forward positions in order to halt the enemy.

Having worn down the German Army in heavy defensive engagements, in December 1941, the Soviet troops drove the Nazi hordes back from the walls of the capital and pushed them to the west. The defeat at Moscow dispelled the legend of the invincibility of the Nazi Army. The historic victory at Moscow inspired the Soviet people to new feats and strengthened their confidence that the enemy would inevitably be defeated.

M. I. Kalinin ("Stat'i i rechi (1941-1946)" [Articles and Speeches (1941-1946)], Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, pp 60-62)

The offensive against Moscow...cost the Germans exceptionally dearly. For the German Command the plan to surround and seize Moscow ended in a defeat and the Nazi Army on the approaches to Moscow suffered a cruel defeat which with every passing day assumed ever-greater scope....

Undoubtedly, the approaches to Moscow became that place where the defeat of the armies of German fascism started.

D. F. Ustinov ("Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp 91-95)

The first major defeat of the Nazi troops around Moscow buried the hopes of the Nazis of a blitzkrieg. The dawn of the victory over fascism broke by the walls of Moscow.... The historic victory of the Soviet troops at Moscow became the beginning to a fundamental change in the course of the war. Clearly apparent were the might and invincibility of the socialist state, the moral-political unity of the Soviet people, the mass heroism and combat might of the army, the dedication of the people and the army to the Communist Party as the leader and organizer of all our victories.

G. K. Zhukov ("Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Remembrances and Reflections], Vol 2, 2d Supplemented Edition, Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1974, p 58)

The Red Army in the Battle of Moscow for the first time in the 6 months of the war dealt a major defeat to the main grouping of Nazi troops. Prior to this the Soviet Armed Forces had already carried out a number of serious operations which checked the Wehrmacht's advance on all the three major sectors of its attack. Nevertheless, in their scale and results they were inferior to the great battle by the walls of the Soviet capital.

Prominent Political, State and Military Figures of the United States, England and France

From the message of the U.S. President F. D. Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, M. I. Kalinin, of 11 February 1942 ("Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny" [Soviet Foreign Policy During the Period of the Patriotic War], Documents and Materials, Vol 1, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1946, p 464)

The decisiveness and successfulness with which the peoples of the Soviet Union have thrown back the hordes of aggressors inspire the other peoples fighting to maintain their independence.

From the speech of W. Churchill over London Radio on 15 February 1942 (PRAVDA, 28 October 1981, p 3)

The Russians are victoriously advancing.... Moreover, for the first time they have dispelled the Hitler legend. Instead of victories in Russia, the Germans have found defeat, failures, the shame of unheard-of crimes, bloodshed and the loss of millions of German soldiers....

from the speech of Gen C. de Gaulle over London Radio on 20 January 1942
(C. de Gaulle, "Military Memoirs," Vol 1, Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1957, p 657)

There is no honest Frenchman who would not welcome the victory of Russia (at Moscow. --Editors).

The German Army...is now retreating under the blows of the Russian troops, undermined by the cold, hunger and disease....

At the same time that the might of Germany and its prestige have been shaken, the sun of Russian glory is ascending to its zenith. The entire world has been convinced that this people of 175 million is worthy of being called great because it knows how to fight, that is, to overcome the set-backs and make retaliatory blows, because it itself has risen up, taken up its arms and organized itself for combat and because the severest hardships did not shake its solidarity....

Gen D. MacArthur (PRAVDA, 28 October 1981, p 3)

...Nowhere have I seen such effective resistance to the strongest blows of the up-to-that-time victorious enemy, resistance which was followed by a counteroffensive which threw the enemy back to its own territory. The scope and brilliance of this effort make it a great military accomplishment in all history.

Admissions of Former Nazi Generals and West German Historians

H. Guderian ("Vospominaniya soldata" [The Memoirs of a Soldier], translated from the German, Voenizdat, 1954, p 249)

The offensive against Moscow had collapsed.... We have suffered a major defeat which...in the next few weeks would lead to fatal consequences.

G. Blumentritt ("Rokovyye resheniya" [Fatal Decisions], translated from the German, Voenizdat, 1958, p 108)

...The campaign in Russia and particularly its turning point, the Battle of Moscow, dealt the first strong blow against Germany both in political and military terms.

K. Assman ("Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1963, p 296)

The turning point in the course of the war occurred on the battlefields around Moscow. Here at the end of 1941, for the first time the offensive might of the German Armed Forces was broken as they encountered a mission beyond their capacity.

K. Reinhardt ("Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1975, p 302)

...Hitler's plans and along with this the chances for the successful conduct of the war by Germany collapsed in October 1941, particularly with the start of the Russian

counteroffensive at Moscow in December 1941. ...The strategic goals of Hitler were finally canceled by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet leadership and its armed forces....

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